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This article explores two assumptions about constitutional law and the 
form of practical reasoning inherent in constitutional argument and decision 
that have shaped the debate over originalism.  The first assumption—adopted 
by originalists—is that constitutional reasoning is a formalistic process. 
Originalism’s critics tacitly describe a very different and less formalistic 
model.  The second assumption—shared by originalists and most of its critics 
alike—is that the central task of constitutional decision is to interpret the 
Constitution.  
Both of these assumptions are wrong.  Constitutional argument is not, and 
cannot be, reduced to the formal model of reasoning tacitly employed in 
originalism.  The critics of originalism correctly point out that constitutional 
argument is more complex than originalism’s formal account allows.  But 
those critics share with originalists the mistaken premise that our 
constitutional practice begins with interpretation.  That agreement masks the 
substantial differences in their respective accounts of interpretation, however. 
This Article demonstrates how these two assumptions have contributed to 
the fruitlessness of the debate.  For example, if we reject the premise of the 
logical priority of interpretation the celebrated problem of generality 
dissolves. By articulating the jurisprudential foundations of the debate, this 
Article allows us to recognize the sterility of the debate over originalism and 
the likelihood that it cannot be successfully resolved by the protagonists on 
either side of the debate.  While discarding the formalism of contemporary 
originalism does not compromise core originalist claims, the importance of 
that formalism to some of originalism’s stronger claims of privilege makes 
such an approach less attractive to originalism.  Originalism’s critics, while 
right about constitutional reasoning, fail to discredit other important 
originalist claims.  Thus, the protagonists in the debate may be likely to 
continue even after better understanding interpretation and the practice of 
constitutional argument.  That would be a mistake.  A better account of the 
place of interpretation and the nature of practical reasoning in constitutional 
reasoning also opens up the alternative of moving beyond the fruitless, 
stalemated debate about originalism.  
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INTRODUCTION 
I.  ACCOUNTING FOR CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND REASONING 
 
Originalism is not a theory of constitutional reasoning or a theory about 
the nature of constitutional interpretation.1  The classical originalists did not 
come to their theory from a refined approach to language or hermeneutics.2  It 
is a legal or jurisprudential theory of the Constitution and about constitutional 
                                                 
1 Mitch Berman has previously made this point. See Mitchell N. Berman, 
Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) [hereinafter Berman, Originalism] 
(“[O]riginalism maintains that courts ought to interpret constitutional provisions solely 
in accordance with some feature of those provisions' original character.”); see also 
William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2018) [hereinafter Baude, Originalism as a Constraint] (describing the movement in 
originalism from a theory of judicial constraint to a positive theory of constitutional 
law). 
2 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 115 (Amy Gutmann ed., 
1997) [hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETATION] [hereinafter Dworkin, Interpretation] 
(complimenting Justice Scalia, ironically, for having given his talk on interpretation 
without referencing the work of Gadamer or hermeneutics); D. A. Jeremy Telman, 
Originalism: A Thing Worth Doing . . . , 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 529, 537–40 (2016) 
(describing the roots of originalism in a reaction to the constitutional jurisprudence of 
the Warren Court). 
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decision.3  Its critics generally do not contest its claims on the basis of the 
nature of constitutional reasoning or the place of interpretation in 
constitutional theory and decision.4  The abstraction of the continuing debate 
increasingly obscures both the genealogy and import of originalism and the 
stakes of the debate itself.5  
The debate over originalism is fruitless and pathological.6  Turning to the 
tacit competing accounts of practical reasoning and interpretation therefore 
                                                 
3 See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363–72 (1977) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT 
BY JUDICIARY] (arguing that the Warren Court’s Equal Protection Clause 
jurisprudence had moved very far from the original, historical understanding of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1–6 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral 
Principles] (contrasting principled judicial decision pursuant to the Constitution to 
discretionary, value-laden decisions); SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 9–14 
(describing originalist interpretation as necessary to avoid usurpation of power by the 
courts).  
4 See Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1368, 
1378–79 (1990) [hereinafter Posner, Bork]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: 
WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 71–73 (2005) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RADICALS] (arguing against originalism on prudential, 
consequentialist grounds); Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 126–27 (arguing 
that the best way to interpret the Constitution requires incorporating moral theory into 
that interpretive process); Laurence Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, 
supra note 2, at 93–94 [hereinafter Tribe, Interpretation] (arguing that there are 
different kinds of provisions in the Constitution, some of which admit of simpler, 
semantic interpretation and others of which state principles that must be articulated 
and applied in a more complex and principled way).  But see Cass R. Sunstein, There 
is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMM. 193, 202 (2015) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Nothing] (arguing that claims about the nature of interpretation do not argue 
for originalism). 
5 Some of this occurs expressly, as originalism is reformulated as a positive or 
natural law theory of law.  See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2349, 2351–52 (2015) [hereinafter Baude, Our Law] (defending an account of 
originalism as a positivist theory of constitutional law); Jeffrey Pojanowski & Kevin 
C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97, 117–21 (2016) [hereinafter 
Pojanowski & Walsh, Enduring Originalism] (natural law account of originalism).  
But there are also strands in the debate in which the protagonists simply seem to lose 
track of or tacitly abandon originalism’s purpose as the debate continues to unfold.  
See Richard S. Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and the Complete 
Constitution, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 2, 7 (2017) [hereinafter Kay, 
Constitutional Construction] (rejecting the New Originalists’ project of constitutional 
construction because it reopens the floodgates of judicial discretion). 
6 This article is one of a series exploring and dissolving the debate over 
originalism.  The complex, interrelated arguments made in the series are generally 
brought together in André LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel: Originalism, Its Critics, and 
54       UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 16, No. 1 
 
may appear either a dead end or an unimportant exercise in the intellectual 
history of the turn of the millennium.  It appears of little interest and largely a 
waste of effort.  In fact, understanding those foundational premises reinforces 
my arguments about the sterility of the debate over originalism and helps us to 
translate what is valuable about the discourse of the debate back into the 
constitutional vernacular of our decisional practice.   
The premises about interpretation and practical reason play a central role 
in the formulation of originalism as well as in the debate.  Originalism offers 
a highly formal account of constitutional reasoning, recognizing only specific 
kinds of constitutional authority.7  Indeed, originalism sometimes goes so far 
as to suggest that constitutional reasoning may be cast as a series of 
syllogisms.8  Originalism’s critics generally offer a less formal account of 
constitutional reasoning.9  The elements that count as constitutional authority 
are more wide ranging and the reasoning with respect to such authorities is far 
less formal.10  As with other elements in the debate, however, inconsistent 
stances with respect to the nature of interpretation and constitutional reasoning 
inform the debate without being generally recognized or articulated. 
At the outset, it is important to outline the relationship among the theories 
of meaning, interpretation, and practical reason inherent in the originalism 
debate.  As I have explored before,11 the theories of constitutional meaning—
accounts of what the Constitution says, rather than, for the most part, what the 
Constitution does—are largely implicit in the debate over originalism.  They 
describe the import of the Constitution that interpretation aims to identify and 
                                                 
the Promise of Our American Constitution, 26 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel] and André LeDuc, 
Beyond Babel: Achieving the Promise of Our American Constitution, 64 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 185 (2016) [hereinafter LeDuc, Beyond Babel]. 
7 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 262 (1990) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING] (criticizing non-
originalist constitutional reasoning for not proceeding with major and minor premises 
from the Constitution); SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 44–45. 
8 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 262. 
9 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 75 (2010) 
[hereinafter BREYER, DEMOCRACY]; DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 169–79 
(1996) [hereinafter PATTERSON, TRUTH] (expressly rejecting a formal account of legal 
argument); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 269–72 (1990) 
[hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMS]; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 
6–8 (2008) [hereinafter TRIBE, INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION]; LAURENCE H. TRIBE & 
MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 59–60, 87–91 (1991) [hereinafter 
TRIBE & DORF, READING]; SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4 at 5.  
10 See generally BREYER, DEMOCRACY. supra note 9.  
11 André LeDuc, Making the Premises about Constitutional Meaning Express: 
The New Originalism and Its Critics, 31 BYU J. PUB. L. 111 (2017) [hereinafter 
LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning] 
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articulate.  Once that meaning has been articulated by the process of 
interpretation, additional steps in the process of practical reasoning are 
employed to determine the decision of the constitutional controversy at bar.  
Thus, in the originalism debate, both sides generally take meaning to be the 
end of interpretation and the beginning of the chain of practical reasoning that 
decides a case.  As with the tacit accounts of meaning in the debate, the 
accounts of interpretation and practical reasoning are largely tacit, too. 
The debate over originalism accords interpretation a fundamental and 
foundational role in constitutional law in general and constitutional 
adjudication in particular that it does not play.  My first task in this article is 
to explain why the assumption about the fundamental nature of interpretation 
is mistaken and how it informs the originalism debate.  Originalism—the New 
Originalism—addresses this mistake by qualifying the role of interpretation 
and proclaiming a fundamentally important distinction between interpretation 
and construction.12  Attention to the purported distinction between 
interpretation and construction is one of the two key moves in the New 
Originalism.13  My second task in this article is to argue why that distinction 
is not only problematic, but also a dead end in revivifying originalism and 
winning the debate for the originalists. 
I first argue that originalism largely assumes that the task of constitutional 
adjudication begins with interpretation, an assumption that most of 
originalism’s critics share.14  I have previously explored the concepts of 
                                                 
12 See generally Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Interpretation and Construction]; 
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 453 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Constitutional Construction]; Lawrence B. 
Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) 
[hereinafter Solum, Distinction]. 
13 See generally Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 
609 (2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, New Originalism]; Keith Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004) [hereinafter Whittington, New 
Originalism]; Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, supra note 12; Solum, 
Constitutional Construction, supra note 12.  But see John McGinnis & Michael 
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the 
Case against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009) (challenging the need for 
constitutional construction in originalism); Kay, Constitutional Construction, supra 
note 5 (arguing that the introduction of the methods is unnecessary and, moreover, 
compromises the originalist project of cabining judicial discretion).  The other key 
difference between the new and the old is reliance on the original public semantic 
meanings rather than the original intentions of the relevant actors.  
14 For a critical analysis of the triumph of interpretative theories see Michael 
Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 871, 942–57 (1989) [hereinafter Moore, Interpretative Turn]; see also Michael 
Moore, Interpreting interpretation, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL 
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constitutional meaning in the debate, the target at which interpretation aims, 
as Richard Fallon has put it.15  I will explore in some detail the claims and 
commitments made as to the nature of the interpretative project.  
Interpretation, according to originalists, provides the necessary nexus between 
the text and the constitutional question presented for decision.  The assumed 
need for an interpretation creates the potential for the originalists and their 
critics to debate the so-called problem of generality.16  The problem of 
generality dissolves without the tacit assumption of the need for an 
interpretation before a constitutional provision may be applied in 
constitutional adjudication.17  
Although the commitment to interpretation is shared by many of 
originalism’s critics,18 some critics of originalism, including pragmatists like 
Posner, have challenged the assumption that interpretation is prior to 
                                                 
PHILOSOPHY 1 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) [hereinafter LAW AND INTERPRETATION] 
[hereinafter Moore, Interpretation] (arguing against an interpretive account of the 
law).  While some of originalism’s critics have offered an alternative non-
interpretative account of adjudication, that alternative has not been the mainstream line 
of criticism, and it takes the challenge to originalism in a direction different from that 
defended by the principal critics.  See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, FATE] (arguing 
that constitutional law is created by sometimes inconsistent modes of argument that 
are not simply deployed as interpretations of the Constitution to decide constitutional 
cases). 
15 LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 11, at 111; Richard Fallon, The 
Meaning of Meaning, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1237 (2015) [hereinafter Fallon, 
Meaning] (“Almost self-evidently, meaning is the object, or at least one of the objects, 
that statutory and constitutional interpretation seek to discover.” (footnote omitted)).
  
16 See generally TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 73–80 (arguing that 
there is a fundamental interpretative problem in constitutional interpretation because 
the level of generality of the constitutional provisions is unspecified). 
17  Id.; Robert B. Brandom, A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination: 
The Normative Fine Structure of the Judges’ Chain Novel, in PRAGMATISM, LAW, AND 
LANGUAGE 19, 21–22 (Graham Hubbs & Douglas Lind eds., 2014) [hereinafter 
Brandom, Legal Concept Determination; LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 
11, at 118 n.27, 218. 
18 See, e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–27 (1986) [hereinafter 
DWORKIN, EMPIRE] (describing an idiosyncratic concept of legal interpretation); 
Moore, Interpretative Turn, supra note 14 at 891-92.  But see Dennis Patterson, 
Interpretation in Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 685, 686–88 (2005) [hereinafter 
Patterson, Interpretation] (arguing against the priority of interpretation in 
understanding or applying law). 
2017  THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 57 
 
understanding and decision.19  They argue that the task of adjudication—of 
judging—cannot be reduced to one of interpretation, even when a 
constitutional case presents a question of the application of a constitutional 
text.20  They argue that the task is not a semantic one because decision must 
focus on the consequences of potential decisions and rationales.21  I have 
explored the pragmatist account in a companion article.22  Here, I will explore 
the non-pragmatist objections to the interpretative model of constitutional 
decision.  One such objection is made by natural law theorists, including 
natural law originalists.23  These theorists assert that the overriding authority 
of natural law must inform the reading and application of positive law—
regardless of what reading the best interpretation of that positive law might 
otherwise yield.24  The interpretive model should be rejected, in the natural 
law theorists’ view, because the mission of constitutional adjudication is not 
the interpretation of the meaning of constitutional provisions; rather, it is 
deciding the merits of the competing claims in a constitutional controversy—
within the decisional metrics of our constitutional practice. 
Interpretation is neither central to constitutional decision nor must 
interpretation logically precede such decision.  Interpretation is an important 
element in the textual mode of constitutional argument and, to a lesser degree, 
in historical argument.  It is not important in the other modes of constitutional 
argument. 
By contrast with the generally shared emphasis on interpretation, the 
protagonists in the debate advance very different accounts of practical 
                                                 
19 See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 9, at 269–72 (questioning whether the 
judicial project of applying statutory or constitutional provisions is best characterized 
as interpretation). 
20 See generally Posner, Bork, supra note 4, at 1380–81 (“The originalist faces 
backwards, but steals frequent sideways glances at consequences.  The pragmatist 
places the consequences in the foreground.”). 
21 Id. 
22 See generally André LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism and Pragmatism in the 
Debate about Originalism, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 613 (2016) [hereinafter LeDuc, 
Paradoxes of Positivism] (arguing that there is a fundamental failure on the part of the 
originalists and their pragmatist critics to engage because they disagree about the 
underlying question whether the Constitution should be interpreted from a 
deontological or consequentialist stance). 
23 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION 
OF LIBERTY 122–25 (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, LOST]; Moore, Interpretative Turn, 
supra note 14, at 917–18. 
24 See ROBERT P. GEORGE, Natural Law and Positive Law, in IN DEFENSE OF 
NATURAL LAW 102, 107–09 (1999) [hereinafter GEORGE, Natural Law] (explaining 
the direct and indirect ways that positive law may be derived from natural law).  See 
generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2011) 
[hereinafter FINNIS, NATURAL LAW].  
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reasoning in constitutional theory and decision.  Originalists, on the one hand, 
characterize key—if not all—steps of constitutional reasoning as formal 
syllogisms with constitutional text providing the major premises in such 
arguments.25  That characterization of constitutional reasoning is an important 
constitutive element of originalism's highly formalistic theory of constitutional 
argument and reasoning.26  The consequence of this model of constitutional 
reasoning is that originalism endorses an account of an almost mechanical 
judicial decision-making process.27  Critics, on the other hand, do not share all 
of originalism’s assumptions about constitutional reasoning.  Instead, the 
critics describe constitutional reasoning and argument as ranging beyond 
formal syllogisms, with relevant premises in such arguments going beyond the 
premises derived directly from the constitutional text.28  Their model of 
reasoning is much more open-ended. 
But neither the originalists nor their critics articulate the implications of 
their competing descriptions of constitutional reasoning.  For example, 
Dworkin denies the formal account of legal reasoning from legal rules that 
originalism offers.29  He argues that constitutional reasoning is more complex 
and its sources broader.30  But Dworkin effectively assimilates constitutional 
reasoning in decisions to philosophical reasoning.31  That characterization is 
                                                 
25 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 262 (endorsing the model of the 
syllogism with major and minor premises in constitutional reasoning). 
26 See generally infra Part III. 
27 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 45 (characterizing the 
Constitution as generally “simple to apply”); Kay, Constitutional Construction, supra 
note 5, at 25 (“Constitutional construction, at its heart, puts its trust in human judgment 
not in historically fixed rules.  This is—not to put too fine a point on it—the opposite 
of constitutionalism.”). 
28 See, e.g., BREYER, DEMOCRACY, supra note 9, at 78–82 (defending an account 
of the Living Constitution from the perspective of an anti-originalist justice of the 
Supreme Court). 
29 Thus, Dworkin denies that all legal authorities have the structure of legal rules.  
See, e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, The Model of Rules: I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
14, 22–23 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING] [hereinafter DWORKIN, Rules I] 
(arguing that law consists not only of legal rules that may be applied simply, but also 
of legal principles which are more complex and more reasoned, as well as less 
peremptory). 
30 DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 365–89 (considering the proper authorities 
to be considered in deciding a case like Brown). 
31 Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity ascribes a substantial place to the 
coherence and consistency of the public and private law and argues that such law must 
ultimately be formulated in light of our moral and political theory; only philosophical 
argument can satisfy that requirement.  See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 96–
98 (emphasizing both the interaction of law and moral theory and that they remain 
distinct); see also André LeDuc, The Ontological Foundations of the Debate over 
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questionable, too.  It is questionable both because philosophical argument does 
not look like constitutional argument and because philosophical argument, as 
a metaphilosophical matter, does not play that role in our constitutional 
practice.32 
More fundamentally, Toulmin has challenged the project of reducing 
practical reasoning to a formal, logical account.33  The practice of 
constitutional argument is not described well by the formal account offered by 
originalism.  That descriptive failure grounds an important argument as to why 
the originalist account cannot be an adequate account of constitutional 
reasoning.  There is no stance outside our practice of constitutional argument 
from which to criticize those arguments that are made and the results that are 
obtained.  The absence of such an Archimedean or neutral stance puts a 
premium on the accuracy and completeness of descriptive accounts of 
constitutional law.  It is on the basis of those descriptions and, sometimes, 
redescriptions of our constitutional law from within our practice that 
constitutional arguments may be made. 
Originalism’s principal critics also generally fail to offer an account of 
practical reasoning in our constitutional practice that allows a place for the 
exercise of judgment.34  For example, Ronald Dworkin defends a “Right 
Answer Thesis” that asserts that every legal question, including every 
constitutional question, has a unique right answer that can be identified by the 
application of his decisional method.35  Instead of articulating the role of 
judgment in constitutional decision, the critics seek an algorithmic account that 
can fully explain the process of constitutional decision.36  That search is 
                                                 
Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 263, 317 (2015) [hereinafter LeDuc, Ontological 
Foundations].  
32 See André LeDuc, The Relationship of Constitutional Law to Philosophy: Five 
Lessons from the Originalism Debate, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 155 (2014) 
[hereinafter LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation].  
33 See STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT vii (updated ed. 2003) (1958) 
[hereinafter TOULMIN, ARGUMENT] (criticizing “the assumption, made by most Anglo-
American academic philosophers, that any significant argument can be put in formal 
terms . . . [as] a rigidly demonstrable deduction . . . .”). 
34 For a non-originalist statement of the importance of judgment, see Charles 
Fried, On Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1025, 1043–44 (2011) [hereinafter 
Fried, Judgment] (defending the claim that constitutional questions require the 
exercise of judgment and that the strongest opinions of Justice Scalia are not those that 
hew most closely to his originalist jurisprudential theory, but those that reflect a 
compelling constitutional judgment).  
35 See RONALD DWORKIN, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119 (1985) (arguing that there is one right answer even to hard 
legal questions); DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 43–44. 
36 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Hercules, Abraham Lincoln, the United States 
Constitution, and the Problem of Slavery, in RONALD DWORKIN 136, 149–55 (Arthur 
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misguided.  I’ll describe an alternative account of constitutional reasoning.  On 
that account, while argument is constrained by convention—or something like 
it—judgment must always play an important role.  
Admittedly, some of originalism’s critics also endorse this alternative 
account of constitutional reasoning.37  But some of those same critics repudiate 
the originalists’ formal account of constitutional reasoning only to assimilate 
constitutional reasoning to political decision-making.38  That, too, is a mistake.  
It is a mistake because our practice of constitutional argument and decision 
operates within its own framework, distinct from if not entirely independent 
of the political decision-making sphere.39  Naked political arguments are not 
made within that practice, and the arguments that are made do not translate or 
reduce nicely to political argument.40 
My third and final task in this article is to explain how the claims made 
here about the originalism debate fit together with my claim that the debate is 
grounded in mistaken or confused premises and that it is fruitless and 
pathological.  Because the protagonists in the debate assume different premises 
about constitutional interpretation and constitutional reasoning, it is hardly 
surprising that they talk past each other in the debate.  Most obviously, this 
article develops the account of reasoning and interpretation that I sketched in 
                                                 
Ripstein ed., 2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Hercules] (criticizing Dworkin’s 
description of constitutional decision because it fails to determine how Dred Scott 
ought to have been decided).  But see BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 6–7 
(emphasizing the role of constitutional judgment and asserting that no constitutional 
theory can determine decisions). 
37 See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 80–81; Levinson, Hercules, 
supra note 36, at 155. 
38 See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An Essay in 
Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623, 646–47 (1984).  See generally MARK 
TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
(1988); STANLEY FISH, Wrong Again, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, 
RHETORIC AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 105 
(1989); STANLEY FISH, Working on the Chain Gang, in DOING WHAT COMES 
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND 
LEGAL STUDIES 87 (1989) [hereinafter FISH, Working on the Chain Gang].  
39 See Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1311–12 (1989) 
[hereinafter Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?]; BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 6.  
40 See CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 241–44 (2004) [hereinafter FRIED, SAYING] (arguing that the 
demands of doctrine result in Justices voting and arguing in ways that do not reduce 
easily to traditional political classifications); BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 6 
(offering examples of kinds of arguments that are impermissible in constitutional 
adjudication); Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, supra note 39, at 1302–12 (arguing that such 
a reduction of law to politics misunderstands the nature of constitutional argument and 
our constitutional practice). 
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my earlier articles.41  It also complements the claims I have made about how 
the premises about constitutional meaning factor into the debate.  Moreover, 
from the critical strands in this analysis, we can also draw out the elements in 
the debate that may be incorporated into a more productive constitutional 
discourse.  That discourse rejects foundational assumptions and acknowledges 
that there is no Archimedean stance from which we can assess constitutional 
argument and decision.  Our argument and decision must be carried on within 
our practice as a matter of the social facts that comprise that practice. 
II.  THE PRIORITY AND PRIMACY OF INTERPRETATION 
A. The Interpretative Claims of Classical Originalism 
 
Underlying the originalism debate is the originalist claim that the mission 
of constitutional adjudication is principally constitutional interpretation.42  
First, originalists are committed to the logical priority of interpretation: 
constitutional adjudication must begin with the interpretation of the meaning 
of the constitutional text (or, in some cases, the relevant constitutional 
precedent).43  Second, originalists are committed to the primacy of 
interpretation: the reading of the constitutional text provided by interpretation 
provides a privileged ground on which to decide the case at hand.44  Therefore, 
originalists argue, interpretation of the constitutional text trumps other grounds 
of decision.45 
                                                 
41 See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31, at 274–88, 306–22 
(briefly describing the accounts of interpretation and reasoning underlying the 
opposing positions in the debate over originalism); see also LeDuc, Constitutional 
Meaning, supra note 11 (exploring in some detail that theoretical assumptions about 
meaning in general and the nature of the meaning of the constitutional text in 
particular). 
42 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 37, 46-47. 
43 The role of precedent and, in particular, non-originalist precedent has always 
been problematic for originalism.  See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 157–
59; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 138–40 (asserting that originalism’s 
approach to precedent is not dissimilar to that of other theories). 
44  See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 37–47. 
45  See id. at 37–39.  
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Those commitments are generally implicit.46  They seem sometimes to be 
taken to be so obvious as to warrant no attention.47  Interpretation is generally 
thought to be necessary both for understanding the constitutional text and for 
constitutional decision.48  The originalist project is to interpret the Constitution 
by determining and then privileging49 the original understanding of the 
meaning of the Constitution.50  The originalist interpretations then provide the 
propositions to support the reasoning to originalist constitutional decision.51  
The originalist interpretive model has an intuitive appeal—at least for early 
twenty-first century American lawyers—that non-interpretive theories do not 
have.52  Such non-interpretive theories do not have that appeal because of the 
                                                 
46 See id.; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 139-41 (grounding the need for the 
Court to interpret the Constitution on the basis of the original understanding in the 
requirements of the democratic republic and the so-called countermajoritarian 
problem).  But see Patterson, Interpretation, supra note 18 (denying interpretation 
priority in judicial decision). 
47 See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 
7; Frank H. Easterbrook, Alternatives to Originalism?, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
479, 485–86 (1993) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Alternatives]. 
48 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 44–45 (asserting that the 
difficulties of deciding cases are negligible for originalism compared to those facing 
alternative theories). 
49 See id. at 37–39. 
50 See id.; Whittington, New Originalism, supra note 13, at 599. 
51 SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 43–44 (offering an originalist 
account of the requirements of the confrontation clause). 
52 Interpretative theories might not have the same appeal in the English common 
law tradition to the extent that common law methods are even more dominant.  See id. 
at 3–9 (describing the exhilaration of the common law for law students, lawyers, and, 
above all, judges).  Interpretative theories have an intuitive appeal to us because they 
assimilate our efforts to follow the constitutional directives to other common forms of 
communicative behavior.  Sunstein captures that assimilation best.  See SUNSTEIN, 
RADICALS, supra note 4, at 57 (“Fundamentalism also seems to have a justification in 
ordinary thinking about interpretation.  If your friend asks you to do something, you’re 
likely to try to understand the original meaning of his words.”).  Sunstein is likely 
mistaken here, in an understandable but philosophically naïve way.  You don’t try to 
understand the meaning of the words; you try to understand what your friend would 
like you to do.  Well, Sunstein might reply, without the ability to read minds, how is 
that to be done without understanding what the words mean?  While it is natural to 
assume that the process of understanding begins with, and his focused on, 
understanding the words employed, that claim is hardly well-defended—or clearly 
established.  See THOMAS NAGEL, Sexual Perversion, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 39, 45–
48 (1979) (exploring the complex non-linguistic communication patterns in normal 
human sexual desire).  
2017  THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 63 
 
prevalence of the interpretative model.53  That dominance is not limited, of 
course, to the confines of the originalism debate.54   
Classical originalism takes the task of constitutional theory and the task of 
the judge in constitutional adjudication as that of interpreting the 
Constitution.55  Classical originalism assumes that if it can show that the 
constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren Court was not rooted in 
interpretations of the meaning of the Constitution, then the legitimacy of that 
constitutional jurisprudence can be called into question.56  Generally, classical 
originalists assert that the project of interpretation should be aimed at 
articulating the meaning of the relevant constitutional provision.57 
Understanding originalism’s commitment to its account of constitutional 
decision as a matter of interpretation starts with originalism’s definition of 
                                                 
53 See Moore, Interpretive Turn, supra note 14, at 873 (acknowledging the 
prevalence of interpretive theory, but arguing that a variety of interpretive theories that 
purport to avoid the debate between realism and anti-realism, including that defended 
by Dworkin, are metaphysically and epistemologically mistaken).   
54 See generally Moore, Interpretive Turn, supra note 14, at 873; LAW AND 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 53, at 873; THE INTERPRETATIVE TURN: PHILOSOPHY, 
SCIENCE, CULTURE (David R. Hiley et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter INTERPRETATIVE 
TURN].   
55 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 2 (1999) [hereinafter 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, 
at 154 (characterizing originalism as a “method of interpretation”); SCALIA, 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 9–14 (rejecting broader common law decisional 
methods with respect to constitutional law).  But see Baude, Our Law, supra note 5, at 
2405–10 (arguing that originalism is not a theory of interpretation but a positivist 
theory of law). 
56 Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 3, at 6–8.  See generally BERGER, 
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 3. 
57 Fallon, Meaning, supra note 15, at 1237. 
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interpretation58—to determine the meaning of a text.59  Originalism begins 
with the intuition that the general or abstract language of a constitutional 
provision does not always immediately or obviously provide an answer to a 
constitutional question or dispute that presents itself.60  Interpretation is the 
principal technique that instantiates the general meaning of the constitutional 
text in the particular context at hand.61  That meaning may be based upon the 
framers’ original understandings, intentions, or expectations.  The relevant 
community with respect to such social facts may vary in different forms of 
originalism, but in each case, originalism assumes the existence of such 
                                                 
58 Interpretation is a complex and controversial concept.  See generally 
INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford Levinson 
& Steven Mailloux eds., 1988) [hereinafter INTERPRETING LAW] (exploring 
fundamental questions with respect to the nature of interpretation in a broad range of 
contexts); INTERPRETIVE TURN, supra note 54 (describing, as the title suggests, the 
important role of interpretation in a wide range of contemporary cultural and academic 
fields); Patterson, Interpretation, supra note 18 (arguing for a limited role for 
interpretation in constitutional practice).  
Classically, interpretation was distinguished from explanation, with explanation 
the project of the natural sciences and interpretation the projects of the humanities.  
Yet even with the weakening, if not collapse, of that distinction, the concept of 
constitutional interpretation as the process of articulating and expressing the meaning 
of the Constitution and of the provisions thereof is widely accepted.  See James F. 
Bohman, et al., Introduction: The Interpretative Turn, in INTERPRETATIVE TURN, at 2–
3 (noting that interpretation does not have an accepted definition). 
59 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 430 (2012) [hereinafter SCALIA & GARNER, 
READING LAW] (defining interpretation as determining the meaning of a text).  
Interpretation is a complex and controversial concept.  See generally 
INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 58 (exploring fundamental questions with respect to 
the nature of interpretation in a broad range of contexts); INTERPRETATIVE TURN, 
supra note 54; Patterson, Interpretation, supra note 18 (arguing for a limited role for 
interpretation in constitutional practice).  
Classically, interpretation was distinguished from explanation, with explanation 
the project of the natural sciences and interpretation the projects of the humanities.  
Yet even with the weakening, if not collapse, of that distinction, the concept of 
constitutional interpretation as the process of articulating and expressing the meaning 
of the Constitution and of the provisions thereof is widely accepted.  See James F. 
Bohman, et al., Introduction: The Interpretative Turn, in INTERPRETATIVE TURN, at 2–
3 (noting that interpretation does not have an accepted definition). 
60 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 45. 
61 See id. (describing the judicial task as applying the constitutional text to “new 
and unforeseen phenomena”); WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 1–
2. 
2017  THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 65 
 
constructs.62  Assuming an unchanging constitutional text, originalism relies 
upon the concept of interpretation to specify the meaning of the general or 
abstract constitutional text in varying contexts.63  The first mission of 
originalists is to identify and articulate the original meaning of the 
constitutional text. Once that is done, the originalists apply that meaning to 
resolve contemporary constitutional disputes.64  While the foundations for that 
mission and the power of the arguments made in reliance on that original 
meaning may appear paradoxical,65 the force and importance of such 
arguments is well established.66 
Bork, perhaps the most important of the early originalists, is representative 
when he describes the interpretive mission expressly as one of interpreting the 
original meaning of the Constitution.67  But originalists generally have not 
focused clearly on the reason why a judge’s task is to interpret the 
Constitution.68  The reason is likely that they typically do not see an 
alternative.69  Two leading originalists who do confront an alternative are 
Judge Bork and Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia believes that the judicial 
                                                 
62 There may be occasional, rare exceptions, but those exceptions are not viewed 
as challenging the originalist theory or posing a material impediment to the mission.  
See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 45; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 
166 (arguing that in the rare case in which the meaning of a constitutional provision 
cannot be determined, such a provision should be given no effect, as if obscured by an 
“ink blot”). 
63 For a non-originalist account of this process, see Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in 
Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171–73 (1993) [hereinafter Lessig, Translation] 
(arguing that the originalists’ self-proclaimed goal of maintaining fidelity to the 
original meaning of the constitutional text requires the methods of translation). 
64 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 9–24; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 2, at 37–38, 45. 
65 Cf. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 9 (noting that the sciences and the arts do 
not admit of such historical arguments). 
66 Indeed, such arguments were clearly well established long before modern 
originalism offered a defense of such methods.  
67 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 139–51.  Justice Scalia also states the 
mission of a judge in interpretative terms.  SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 
37–39.  Other leading originalists take interpretation to be the charge of constitutional 
law, too.  See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1109, 1119–20 (1998) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Dead Hand] (arguing that 
new originalists are textualists committed to interpreting the constitutional words). 
68 See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4, at 57–58. 
69 For an account of the failure to recognize alternatives, see LeDuc, Striding Out 
of Babel, supra note 6 at 10–13.  For an example of such thinking, see BORK, 
TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 251 (characterizing theories of constitutional interpretation 
that reject the original understanding as impossible). 
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alternative to interpreting the Constitution is rewriting it.70  According to 
Justice Scalia, departing from the interpretation of the Constitution’s original 
meaning rewrites the Constitution and results in a body of constitutional law 
that lacks legitimacy.71  It lacks legitimacy because it is grounded neither on 
historic democratic choices embodied in the text of the Constitution nor on an 
authoritative democratic enactment.72  The absence of the former is obvious to 
Justice Scalia.  The absence of consensus follows from the nature of value 
choices and the diversity found in our modern Republic.  Thus, interpretation, 
or lawyers’ work, as Justice Scalia puts it,73 becomes the judicial mission by 
default.74  For Bork, the alternative to originalism is an indeterminate 
constitutional law and uncabined judicial discretion.75  When non-originalist 
authorities are introduced, the judge is left with a broad discretion to read the 
Constitution and decide cases on this account.76 
Interpretation in this context gives a translation or reading of a 
constitutional provision that is focused upon the question at hand.77  The 
originalists would not generally characterize their project of interpretation as 
                                                 
70 SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 86, 140.  Those would not appear 
the only options, however.  As has been remarked, a variety of decisional rules would 
cabin judicial discretion.  See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal 
Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817, 885–87 (2015) [hereinafter Sachs, Legal 
Change]. 
71 SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 9 (arguing that constitutional 
decision employing the full array of common law methods “would be an unqualified 
good, were it not for a trend in government that has developed in recent centuries, 
called democracy”). 
72 Id. at 10. 
73 Id. at 46. 
74 Id. at 46–47; see BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 143–46.  Although Bork 
does not expressly characterize his project as one of interpretation, that project to 
determine the meaning of the Constitution is manifestly interpretative. 
75 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 251–59 (making the strong claim that non-
originalist theories are impossible).  
76 Id. 
77 Originalists have not endorsed the concept of translation that Lessig has 
defended because it emphasizes the distance between the original text and its 
contemporary exposition and application.  See generally Steven G. Calabresi, The 
Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment on Professor Lessig’s Theory of 
Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435 (1997) [hereinafter Calabresi, Lessig’s 
Theory] (criticizing Lessig’s theory of translation as an inadequate description of our 
constitutional practice and yields a quietist theory of constitutional decision that leaves 
no ground from which to criticize decisions that we view as erroneous or misguided); 
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 395 (1995) [hereinafter Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings]; Lessig, 
Translation, supra note 63; Patterson, Interpretation, supra note 18, at 687 (denying 
Quine’s claims about the central place of translation). 
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a matter of translation because translation is generally made from one language 
to another.  The originalists deny that there are different linguistic communities 
across which translation is necessary.78  Thus, constitutional interpretation is 
contextual.  The contexts are the questions of import and force that arise over 
time with respect to the Constitution in our democratic constitutional republic.  
Interpretive theories are dominant today.  There is a substantial literature that 
examines legal interpretation generally, and constitutional interpretation in 
particular, and compares it to the interpretation of other texts.79  For example, 
Justice Scalia’s Tanner lectures at Princeton were titled A Matter of 
Interpretation.80  Similarly, Bork and Easterbrook describe the originalist 
mission as one of interpretation.81  Indeed, the commitment to interpretation 
would appear to range across the varieties of originalism. 
While all varieties of originalism appear committed to an interpretive 
theory, the nature of that commitment varies.  According to the principal 
varieties of originalism, the judge’s task is to interpret the Constitution.82  
Within this assumed interpretive mission, originalism’s contribution is to help 
determine which interpretation of a constitutional provision should be given 
                                                 
78 See generally Calabresi, Lessig’s Theory, supra note 77; Lessig, Understanding 
Changed Readings, supra 78; Lessig, Translation, supra note 63; Patterson, 
Interpretation, supra note 18. 
79 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (3d ed. 2009); DWORKIN, 
EMPIRE, supra note 19, at 228–29; INTERPRETING LAW, supra note 58. 
 But there are alternative accounts of constitutional adjudication that do not rely 
on, or do not rely exclusively on, a model of interpretation.  So, for example, to the 
extent that we characterize the Constitution as a series of rules, there are important 
philosophical theories that suggest that we may follow such rules without need for, or 
recourse to, an interpretation.  See generally LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS §§ 198–202 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1953) [hereinafter 
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS]; Brandom, Legal Concept 
Determination, supra note 17, at 21–22.  Most fundamentally, Wittgenstein appears to 
suggest that we cannot need an interpretation of a rule to follow the rule, because each 
such interpretation would itself need an interpretation.  Moreover, the role of a rule is 
not merely to state a rule; it is to give us a rule.  When we consider that function, we 
may come to wonder and ultimately question whether an interpretation of the meaning 
of a rule could be prior to the ability to apply the rule.  
80 See generally Antonin Scalia, Foreword, in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER 
CENTURY OF DEBATE 37, 43 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007) (referring to originalism 
as a “philosophy of constitutional interpretation”). 
81 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
349, 349–51 (1992); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 146–49. 
82 See Easterbrook, Alternatives, supra note 47, at 485–86 (arguing that there are 
none); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 143–46; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 2, at 37–40.    
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and what ought to be taken into account in that interpretive project.83  The 
originalist answer varies in its particulars.84  Certain originalist theories share 
a strategy to restrict their scope by limiting the role of interpretation generally.  
Michael Perry, for example, believes that interpretation is only one part of the 
task of appellate adjudication.85  Another part of that task is to specify the 
content of indeterminate constitutional provisions.  Interpretation, in Perry’s 
theory, can only operate with respect to specific constitutional provisions.86  
Indeterminate provisions need to be given meaning, but that project is neither 
one of interpretation nor best performed by the courts.  Instead, Perry would 
look to the executive and legislative branches to specify the necessary content 
for such provisions.87 
Similarly, originalists like Keith Whittington give interpretation a logical 
pride of place, while limiting its role and acknowledging the place of 
constitutional construction.88  I have noted above the problems caused by 
                                                 
83 See generally André LeDuc, Evolving Originalism: What Is Privileged?, 5 (Jan. 
12, 2013) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (exploring what original 
intentions, understandings, or expectations ought to be privileged in reading or 
interpreting the Constitution, and how, in the principal varieties of originalism). 
84 Thus, for example, an original expectations theory interprets the constitutional 
text on the basis of the expected effect that the text would have while an original public 
semantic understandings theory interprets the text on the basis of the original public 
understandings.  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 
LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 (1999) (“Perhaps most important of all, however, originalism 
has itself changed-from original intention to original meaning.  No longer do 
originalists claim to be seeking the subjective intentions of the framers.”). 
85 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 
74–75, 95–101 (1994) (arguing that interpretation is the task of the courts only when 
facing determinate provisions of the Constitution.) [hereinafter PERRY, 
CONSTITUTION].  
86 Id. at 70–71. 
87 Id. at 202–04.  Whittington and Barnett adopt a very similar strategy with the 
distinction between interpretation and construction.  Both concede that for 
indeterminate and undetermined provisions the original intentions or understandings 
cannot alone determine the constitutional content.  See WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 7–13 (constitutional 
construction is essentially political); BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23, at 118–130.  
88 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION] (articulating a non-originalist account of 
constitutional construction to permit originalism as an exclusive account of 
constitutional interpretation); WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 55.  
Whittington sorts constitutional provisions into determinate provisions that need only 
interpretation, and indeterminate provisions, for which rules must be constructed by 
the three branches of the Federal government.  Id.; see also Randy E. Barnett, 
Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. 
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incorporation of a broader concept of construction.89  Nevertheless, privileging 
an original understanding of text, expectation, or intent, is what marks an 
interpretative theory as originalist.  For originalists, the neutral, legitimate 
application of the Constitution begins first with interpretation.90  As an 
interpretive theory, originalism is in the mainstream of contemporary theories 
of constitutional interpretation.91 
I have previously explored some of the tacit premises about meaning that 
underlie the debate, including some of the reasons to question those tacit 
premises.92  But even conceding those premises, the protagonists in the debate 
defend or assume questionable claims about constitutional reasoning and the 
place of interpretation.  Originalism’s emphasis on interpretation and its 
disregard for the performative element of constitutional provisions contrast 
with the account originalism offers of the performative role of the Constitution 
as a whole.93  An interpretative account of the constitutional text assumes that 
the meaning of the Constitution is a matter of the semantics of the 
constitutional text.94  A performative account recognizes that the semantic 
meaning of the Constitution is only one contributor to the broader import that 
the constitutional text has in performing certain missions.95 
                                                 
COMMENT. 257, 263–66 (2005) (outlining an exception to preserve non-originalist 
precedent where the Court’s task was one of specifying an indeterminate or 
undetermined constitutional content).  Those strategies may be seen as another attempt 
to deny the indeterminacy of the constitutional doctrine that Bobbitt highlights and 
savors.  See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 31–42 
(1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION] (arguing that classical accounts of the 
indeterminacy of legal doctrine falter because of their failure to recognize the role of 
the competing modes of argument). 
89 See infra text accompanying notes 104–153. 
90 See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 37–40 (contrasting the 
proper task of constitutional interpretation with the more free-ranging process of 
common-law adjudication). 
91 See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY (Rev. 2d ed. 
2005) [hereinafter, MARMOR, INTERPRETATION]; DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31.  
But see PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 9, at 169–72; Moore, Interpretative Turn, 
supra note 14; Patterson, Interpretation, supra note 18 (arguing against the priority of 
interpretation in understanding or applying law). 
92 LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 11. 
93 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 40–41 (describing the 
conservative role of the Constitution and, indeed, any constitution, as preventing the 
erosion or disregard of fundamental social and political values). 
94 See, e.g., id. at 144. 
95 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: 
THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION]; see also BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 139 
(describing the Constitution as providing for two competing fundamental principles: 
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For example, when the text of Article I Section 3 provides that, “[t]he Vice 
President shall be the President of the Senate,” it might appear that the terms 
in the phrase “shall be the President of the Senate” must mean exactly what 
they mean in the corresponding declarative statement and that the meaning of 
the constitutional performative text incorporating those terms therefore shares 
that same meaning.  Indeed, it may be difficult to imagine any ambiguity in 
such a phrase.  Yet the issues that arise in the case of the trial of a proposed 
impeachment of the Vice President demonstrate that questions arise with 
respect to the performative text that do not arise with respect to the declarative 
text.96  Despite the clause’s semantic meaning, it seems unlikely that the Vice 
President could be permitted to preside over his or her own impeachment trial.  
Yet, according to the interpretive account, no such exception would appear 
proper.  The exception naturally understood with respect to the performative 
constitutional text is not a matter of semantics.  Instead, the better explanation 
for the source of the exception is a matter of pragmatics, what the 
constitutional text is doing rather than simply what it is saying.  What it is 
doing is articulating a rule for ensuring that a disinterested judge presides in 
an impeachment trial of the President.  Understood from that performative 
perspective, the corollary in the case of an impeachment trial of the Vice 
President does not pose a difficult question for decision. 
Interpretation of the meaning of the constitutional text assumes that an 
inquiry into the semantic content of the text is sufficient to identify the 
linguistic content of that text.97  Interpretation of a constitutional text takes for 
granted that the meaning of the text is invariant and is formed from its semantic 
components under syntactical rules.  When we consider the performative role 
of the constitutional text, however, we introduce an array of non-semantic 
elements and, indeed, potentially introduce non-linguistic elements into the 
analysis.  The non-linguistic elements are the political and legal practices that 
the constitutional texts implicate.98  To take an example highlighted by 
Bobbitt,99 our understanding of why the stomach pumping by the police in 
                                                 
democratic self government and the protection of certain individual rights against the 
majority). 
96 See generally AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 95. 
97 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 44–45. 
98 I want to distinguish this claim from the claim that there is an Unwritten or 
Invisible Constitution that is to be interpreted along with the conventional written 
Constitution.  While these other non-linguistic social practices with regard to the 
exercise of power by the government and the exercise of freedom and choice by 
citizens inform our readings of the Constitution there is nothing added to our 
understanding by constructing concepts like the Invisible or Unwritten Constitutions. 
99 See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 104–05 (advancing Rochin as an example 
of ethical argument in our constitutional decisional practice on the ground that police 
pumping the stomach of a suspect to secure evidence in a criminal investigation 
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Rochin v. California100 was wrong is as much a matter of the respect we have 
for autonomy with respect to our bodies as the constitutional text.  The 
performative nature of the Constitution, which creates the limited government 
that must respect our corporal autonomy, makes the embedding in and 
reconciliation with those non-linguistic social practices all the more intimate 
and complex.101  Those relationships are more involved and complex than a 
mere declarative text would have. 
Originalism recognizes that the purpose of the Constitution is to do 
something, but it appears to lose sight of that as it addresses particular 
provisions and offers a general theory of constitutional interpretation.102  It 
conflates declarative and performative statements, assimilating the analysis of 
the latter to the analysis of the former.103  Thus, for example, when Justice 
Scalia has repeatedly considered the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
                                                 
constituted an unacceptable State assault on citizens’ autonomy rather than a violation 
of established constitutional law protecting against self-incrimination). 
100  342 U.S. 165 (1952).  
101 Philip Bobbitt captures the performative nature of the United States 
Constitution by contrasting its guarantees with the claims made to objective truth of 
Stalinist Russia (and implicitly the empty, infelicitous performatives of the Soviet 
Union Constitution purportedly guaranteeing individual rights never delivered).  The 
Soviet Constitution’s sweeping guarantee of rights were largely meaningless because 
they lacked a performative power.  For the inspiring provisions of that text, saying did 
not make it so.  See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at xvii (calling out the irrelevance 
of the Soviets’ appeal to objective facts).  The Constitution played a similar 
performative role in constituting the Republic because, while its adoption was 
inconsistent with the Articles of Confederation, it was accepted by the States and by 
the People.  See generally MICHAEL G. KLARMAN, THE FRAMER’S COUP: THE MAKING 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2016). 
102 See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Papers Series No. 07-24 [hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism].  
Professor Solum has questioned whether his SSRN paper ought to be cited, but as it 
does not carry a disclaiming legend, it seems substantially consistent with his other, 
published papers, and he has himself cited it without qualification, I continue to do so 
as well.  See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 482 n.6 (2013); Solum, Interpretation-Construction 
Distinction, supra note 16, at 95 n.2.  
 For the failure to acknowledge the performative role of a particular provision, see 
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 146 (interpreting the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment without considering what that provision 
was doing but instead only articulating certain elements of the semantic meaning of 
such provision). 
103 The conflation appears in a number of respects.  For example, the interpretive 
methods that originalists employ make no distinction between the use of language in 
the Constitution as performative statements and the use of such language in declarative 
statements.  Yet that linguistic use would appear different in important ways.  
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Amendment, he has analyzed it as if it were a declarative sentence.104  Lost in 
that approach is the recognition that what a performative text does may not be 
simply a matter of the semantic or linguistic meanings of the words that 
comprise it.  The performative role of the Confrontation Clause is to establish 
a framework for the introduction of testimonial evidence against individual 
criminal defendants.105  That framework is focused upon the rights of the 
accused, guaranteeing her the right to be confronted by witnesses against 
her.106  But implicitly it at least balances against that right the authority of the 
State to conduct criminal prosecutions.  This abstract description does not shed 
much light on the particular questions about the scope and application of the 
Clause that have arisen. 
If we consider some of those questions that have bedeviled the Court, like 
the treatment of vulnerable children testifying as to abuse claims, however, 
attention to the performative role sheds some light on understanding how to 
apply the Clause.107  As I have noted before, the Clause’s text is written in the 
passive voice; it speaks of being confronted with, rather than confronting, 
adverse witnesses.108  The obvious question is whether that choice of voice is 
significant.  If so, then the identification of the witness and the right to cross-
examine such witnesses and impeach their testimony may satisfy the Clause.  
That reading might find support in the Clause’s performative role in 
establishing the framework for what qualifies as a fair criminal trial that 
adequately limits the State’s exercise of its sovereign power and protects the 
accused.  The performative dimension of the constitutional text reminds us 
what is being done and calls for a reading that comports with that mission. 
If confronted with such a performative analysis, it is likely that the 
originalists would be generally inclined to reject it.  Classically, the rejection 
of a performative analysis was couched in terms of rejecting an interpretation 
                                                 
104 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–54 (2004) (Scalia, J.); see also 
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 43–44 (writing in the period between when 
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (permitting child witnesses to testify by video 
in abuse cases) was decided and Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) 
(reversing Maryland v. Craig, and requiring testimony to be given in person in the 
courtroom), Justice Scalia argued for a more robust reading of the right of 
confrontation). 
105 By focusing on individual criminal defendants I am simply putting to one side 
potentially more complex questions about the rights of non-individual defendants. 
106 U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
107 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 852 (1990) (“We have of course recognized 
that a State’s interest in ‘the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further 
trauma and embarrassment’ is a ‘compelling’ one.”).   
108 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31, 
at 280 n.79. 
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based upon the purposes109 or intentions110 of the authors.  But the appeal to 
the performative element in the constitutional text ought not to be conflated 
with appeals to purpose and intent.  The performative element arises as an 
independent matter of social fact, without regard to subjective purposes or 
intentions.  As explored in the prior paragraph, a performative analysis can 
proceed smoothly without any analysis of authors’ intentions and purposes. 
Yet this performative analysis is not easily assimilated into originalist 
theory.  Even Larry Solum, for example, who has recognized the performative 
element of the constitutional text,111 nevertheless adopts a narrow linguistic 
focus in his analysis of constitutional law.112  For Solum, the performative 
element of constitutional law is a very thin concept and functions only to 
capture the implicature of the constitutional texts.113  Solum either 
misunderstands or rejects a performative account of the constitutional text that 
focuses on what the constitutional text is to do.  He does not endorse an account 
of the linguistic content of the Constitution that includes its political and social 
performative role.114  Instead, he ultimately returns to an account only of its 
linguistic content that focuses on the semantic import of the text.115  
B. New Originalism and The Concept of Constitutional Construction 
 
Critics have challenged the interpretative claims of classical originalism 
by asserting that some constitutional provisions are such that the prospect of 
                                                 
109 See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 144 (asserting that the 
public understanding of the linguistic meaning of the constitutional text controls, not 
the expected or anticipated legal implications arising from the adoption of that text). 
110 See, e.g., BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 3. 
111 See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 102, at 31–37. 
112 See id.  
113 Id. at 36. 
114 For example, Solum’s account of constitutional construction is one of 
translating semantic content to legal content.  If we consider how Solum would 
approach the classic textual puzzle of who would preside over the impeachment trial 
of the Vice President, it is hard to see how his semantic originalism would sort through 
the various sources of legal content in the constitutional text.  One obvious, ordinary 
implicature of the provision of Article I, Section 3, clause 6 that the Chief Justice 
presides over the impeachment trial of the president is that he presides over only that 
trial.  The general provision of Article I Section 3 that the Vice President presides over 
the Senate would then appear to apply, yielding the implausible conclusion that the 
Vice President would preside over her own impeachment trial.  It is unclear that 
Solum’s semantic originalism provides us tools to lead to a more sensible result and 
more plausible application of the Constitution.  Solum has missed the performative 
role of the Constitution.  He cannot get the right reading because he won’t 
acknowledge the fundamental performative role of the constitutional text.  
115 Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 102, at 31–37. 
74       UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 16, No. 1 
 
finding a unique interpretation appears problematic.116  They challenge the 
originalist stance as simplistic.117  New Originalism has responded to this 
criticism, at least in part, by introducing the distinction between constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional construction.118  New Originalism tempers its 
commitment to the priority of interpretation by acknowledging the non-
interpretative role of constitutional construction.119  Construction is proposed 
as the method to elucidate the meaning of constitutional provisions sufficiently 
indeterminate to admit of interpretation.120 
This distinction begins with the constitutional text and the distinction 
between constitutional provisions that ought to be interpreted from those that 
ought to be construed.121  The originalists who draw the distinction between 
interpretation and construction argue that it is grounded on a distinction 
between two kinds of meaning that constitutional texts have.122  Some 
constitutional texts have determinate meanings; the constitutional text has a 
specificity that employs general terms with known and agreed upon 
meanings.123  For those provisions, the task in constitutional appellate 
                                                 
116 See Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 83–87 (arguing that there are different 
types of constitutional provisions as a matter of interpretation).  See generally TRIBE 
& DORF, READING, supra note 9 at 8–13 (arguing against originalism that instead of 
treating the original understanding of the text of the Constitution as controlling we 
ought to treat the principle inherent in the text as determinative—as we now 
understand that principle). 
117 Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 83–87. 
118 Solum, Distinction, supra note 12; Kay, Constitutional Construction, supra 
note 5; Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 13; Randy Barnett, 
Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 65 (2011) [hereinafter 
Barnett, Interpretation]; WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 
88 (defending a theory of constitutional construction that characterizes construction as 
a political process); WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 
55; Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 102; BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23. 
119 Kay, Constitutional Construction, supra note 5; Solum, Distinction, supra note 
12. 
120 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 5–7 
(deploying construction when we confront a constitutional provision with “an 
impenetrable sphere of meaning that cannot be simply discovered.”); Barnett, 
Interpretation, supra note 118; Solum, Constitutional Construction, supra note 13; 
Solum, Distinction, supra note 118, at 103 (“Conceptually, construction gives legal 
effect to the semantic content of a legal text.”). 
121 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 7 
(characterizing the constitutional texts that require construction as “so broad and 
underdetermined as to be incapable of faithful reduction to legal rules.”).  
122 BARNETT, LOST, supra note 118, at 118–30; WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 7. 
123 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (president’s minimum age); see also POSNER, 
PROBLEMS, supra note 9, at 265–66) (offering far-fetched hypothetical alternative 
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adjudication is to interpret the provision in the context of the constitutional 
controversy at hand.124  Examples include the provisions that require the 
president to be at least 35 years of age, prescribe the oath the president must 
swear or affirm, or require revenue bills to originate in the House.125  On 
Whittington’s account, the meaning of the constitutional text is fashioned into 
a rule and applied in adjudication.126 
Other constitutional provisions do not have such determinate meanings.127  
The source of the uncertainty derives from the more abstract general terms 
employed or because such terms employ essentially contested concepts.128  For 
those provisions interpretation is inadequate to determine how such a provision 
is to apply.129  The linguistic meaning of those provisions must be augmented 
to permit constitutional decision.  Construction is thus characterized as a 
necessary step in constitutional decision. 
Somewhat puzzlingly, Whittington gives the example of the non-
constitutional text, “buy a dog,” as an example of a non-interpretable text.130  
He asserts that while the broad parameters of this text are knowable, many 
questions of meaning remain because a reader would not know what kind of 
dog to buy, what color of dog to buy, or how old a dog to buy.131  Although 
Whittington does not carry his claim quite so far, it may be that unless the text 
made clear which dog to buy, when to buy it, who to buy it from, and how 
much to pay for it, the text would require construction.  Whittington treats 
these unanswered questions as to the application of the text as questions of the 
meaning of the text, rather than questions about how a general rule or text is 
to be applied, but he does not explain why.132 
                                                 
readings of the requirement of the constitutional text to support the conclusion that the 
rule stated by the constitutional text has a certain crystalline clarity).  
124 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 118, at 6. 
125 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (revenue bills); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (form of 
presidential inaugural oath); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (president’s minimum age). 
126 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 6. 
127 BARNETT, LOST, supra note 88, at 123 (giving the example of constitutional 
provisions like the Due Process Clause that employ abstract terms); WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 7. 
128 See generally W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. OF THE 
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167 (1956) (arguing that certain concepts are not merely 
controversial as to their meaning in marginal or extreme cases but are inherently 
controversial as their meaning and application). 
129 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 7. 
130 Id. at 7.  It is not entirely clear whether he means the text in its declarative sense, 
as in a narrative, or in its performative sense as an instruction or command. 
131 Id. 
132 Id.  
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Two arguments help make clear how questionable Whittington’s claim 
is.133  First, let us concede that the text is an instruction or command and that 
the task is one of understanding or acting on that instruction or command.  Let 
us also concede that we have no context for the instruction or command.  The 
hypothetical does not tell us anything more about the author, the person to 
whom the text was addressed, or the relationship of the two individuals.  
Consider the case if the individual to whom the text was addressed 
expeditiously purchases a St. Bernard puppy.  Has the individual satisfied the 
instruction or command?  Could the author properly claim, “that is not what I 
meant!!”?  The buyer has bought a dog.  She has done what the instruction or 
command requires.  The subject is a dog, the act is a purchase, and she is the 
agent.  I do not think any more semantic or linguistic analysis is easily 
available.134  She has done what the instruction instructs, consistent with its 
meaning.  The course taken was not the only course of action that would have 
satisfied the instruction or command of the text (the particular act was not a 
unique qualifying act), but it is sufficient to satisfy the instruction.  
The speaker may well be right, of course, that he did not mean that, but 
only if at least one of two conditions are satisfied.  First, he may not have said 
what he meant, so there could easily have been a disconnect between the 
language employed and the meaning intended on his side.  Second, the context 
denied to us in the hypothetical might provide context and pragmatics that 
impose additional constraints on which acts satisfy the instruction, taking into 
account its full meaning and import.  The speaker might be the agent’s partner, 
and the two might live in poverty in a walk-up studio apartment in Brooklyn.  
In that context, a number of reasons militate against the selection of a St. 
Bernard puppy as the dog to buy.  In that case, the speaker would be entitled 
to characterize the action taken as inconsistent with the meaning of the 
instruction given.  
Second, on Whittington’s account it does not appear that we can have texts 
with general terms that can be understood and applied without further 
choice.135  Ironically, given Whittington’s originalism, this appears to be a 
restatement of Tribe’s claim that there is a problem of generality.136  That 
appears to be the implication of his account of the uncertainty of meaning of 
his example.  That seems implausible as a general claim. General statements, 
general performatives, and general rules are just that.  They do not always have 
                                                 
133 See LeDuc, Constitutional Meaning, supra note 11. 
134 The hypothetical eliminates the elements that might provide additional 
pragmatics of meaning. 
135 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 2 (“The 
need to interpret [the Constitution] is taken as the starting point for theory . . . . 
Interpretation is the touchstone of judicial authority.”). 
136 See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 16, at 80–87.  See generally 
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, §§ 198–202.  
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suppressed specifications.137  When the traffic ordinance provides a speed limit 
of 55 miles per hour, we do not have to ask how fast we should go or when 
going as fast as the speed limit allows is imprudent or even unlawful to 
understand the meaning of the ordinance.  The vast literature about meaning, 
ambiguity, and precision in the law and in philosophy simply does not support 
Whittington’s claim.138 
I have previously explored the philosophical arguments against the claim 
that following a rule requires an interpretation.139  Whittington does not make 
any new argument for this claim.  It is as untenable in his hands as in Tribe’s.  
The criticisms that I have previously sketched as to why there is not a problem 
of generality also apply to Whittington’s claim that a constitutional rule 
requires an interpretation before it can be applied.  Constitutional rules are like 
other rules; they can be applied without first interpreting them.  Any contrary 
position invites the infinite regress that Wittgenstein identified and employed 
to construct a reductio against the argument that the application of a rule must 
begin with an interpretation of the rule. 
Whittington might argue (although he fails to do so expressly) that 
constitutional rules are principles and, as such, are not simply characterized as 
rules in the sense that Wittgenstein explores.  Perhaps to follow a principle 
requires an interpretation in ways that following simpler rules does not.  On 
this argument, we can simply understand rules and understand how to apply 
them.  Principles are more complicated, freighted with more inferential 
content, and in need of a determinative interpretation before they can be 
                                                 
137 There is no persuasive reason to argue that there are such suppressed 
specifications than in other premises employed in our practical reasoning.  See ROBERT 
BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFERENTIALISM 84–89 
(2000) [hereinafter BRANDOM, INFERENTIALISM] (arguing against Davidson’s account 
of practical reasoning that imputes suppressed premises to the argument used). 
138 See generally H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125–26 (1961) [hereinafter 
HART, CONCEPT]; ANDREI MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 85–105 (2014) 
[hereinafter MARMOR, LANGUAGE]; Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original 
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980) [hereinafter Brest, Misconceived Quest] 
(exploring the classical example of the prohibition of vehicles in the park); SCOTT 
SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, Special about Law, in 1 
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE: WHAT IT IS AND HOW WE USE IT 403 
(2009) [hereinafter SOAMES, Legal Texts] (arguing that understanding legal texts is not 
fundamentally different from understanding other texts and that both require attention 
to sources of linguistic content that go beyond the semantic content that typically is 
the only source considered in the legal academy); Solum, Distinction, supra note 118. 
139 See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31, at 320–26 (criticizing 
Tribe’s claim that there is a systemic problem of generality in constitutional 
interpretation); LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 32, 
at 113 n.92 (arguing that Wittgenstein’s analysis of following a rule explains why there 
is no problem of generality). 
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applied.140  It may therefore appear that we need an interpretation of a principle 
before it can be applied while we need no such interpretation for a rule.  
Wittgenstein’s examples of rule following are generally directed toward rather 
mechanical rules.141 
But on reflection those arguments are equally powerful against 
constitutional law, whether characterized as rules or as principles.  To see that 
principles may be applied without first endorsing an interpretation, consider a 
constitutional principle like that of the Fourteenth Amendment that of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.142  How could such an 
abstract and seemingly indeterminate provision be applied without an 
interpretation?  To put it another way, how could we apply that provision with 
respect to a challenge to segregated public schools unless we had a view 
whether Plessy or Brown was the right way to read the clause?  If so, aren’t 
those readings interpretations of the clause?  If we have such an interpretation 
or reading, aren’t we then able to apply the principle in constitutional 
adjudication? 
Certainly, if principles are the way that Dworkin describes them, they 
cannot be applied as rules.143  The generality with which principles are stated 
appears to invite elaboration or specification, if not interpretation, before 
application.  But if a principle requires an interpretation before it may be 
applied, then is the infinite regress argument that was developed against the 
claim that finding an interpretation of a rule is logically prior to the application 
of a rule also applicable here?  These are complex questions, and I want to 
remain agnostic about their answers here.  How a constitutional principle is 
employed in constitutional reasoning and decision is more complex than 
simply functioning as a rule.  It may be that there is a process that leads from 
a principle to a rule and then to decision; it may be that such a process involves 
interpretation.  Or it may be that the role of principles is quite different and 
involves neither intermediate rules nor interpretations. Principles may be a 
shorthand indicating the kinds of arguments that are relevant, for example.  In 
any case, Whittington does not articulate the process of reasoning in his 
description of the difference between interpretation and construction. 
Other New Originalists take a different approach to the distinction 
between interpretation and construction.  Randy Barnett rejects Whittington’s 
characterization of the project of construction as political, in part because he 
                                                 
140 Such a claim may find support in Dworkin’s distinction between rules and 
principles, the latter being more open ended and less determinate.  See DWORKIN, 
Rules I, supra note 29, at 22. 
141 See WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, §§ 201–
231 (offering several examples of rules that generate numerical sequences).  
142 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
143 DWORKIN, Rules I, supra note 29, at 22. 
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wants to create a role for natural rights theory in constitutional construction.144  
On his account, the underdetermined constitutional text is to be rendered more 
specific by making choices that are at once consistent with the linguistic 
meaning of the constitutional text and with constitutional principles inherent, 
but unarticulated, in the constitutional text.145  The most obvious principles 
that Barnett calls out are federalism and the separation of powers.146  Barnett 
would presumably not include Ely’s principle of democracy enhancement as 
such a principle, but it is not entirely clear why.147 
Jack Balkin classifies construction as a discrete form of interpretation, to 
be contrasted with interpretation as ascertainment.148  For Balkin, construction 
is necessary when the meaning of a provision cannot be simply ascertained.149  
This can happen when the constitutional text is simply too abstract, or when 
we must look to the principles inherent in the Constitution in much the same 
way that Barnett would do.150  Thus, on Balkin’s account, construction is 
required when the constitutional text states a principle rather than a rule.151  
For those provisions expressing principles, Balkin asserts that the Constitution 
contemplates and demands an articulation and application of that principle.152  
Balkin’s constructive tools partially track Bobbitt’s canonical modes of 
constitutional argument, and he references Bobbitt’s account.153  Balkin does 
                                                 
144  BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23, at 122 (finding the task of construction in the 
gap between abstract constitutional texts and the requirements for legal rules). 
145  Id. at 128. 
146  Id. 
147  Including such a principle would give the Court and Congress broad power to 
intrude into the States’ management and control of the electoral process in ways that 
appear inconsistent with Barnett’s limited, libertarian state.  But it would not generally 
give the federal government the regulatory powers that Barnett finds most troubling.  
See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST] (offering a classic if 
limited defense of the controversial decisions of the Warren Court on the basis that the 
Constitution seeks to enhance democratic decision making and that it often falls to the 
Court to carry out this principle). 
148  JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 4 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM] (asserting that construction is generally treated as a form of 
interpretation). 
149  Id. 
150  Id. at 5–6; BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23, at 122–25 (describing the process of 
articulating constitutional principles to inform the process of constitutional 
construction). 
151  BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 148, at 6–7. 
152  Id.  
153  Id. at 4.  For Bobbitt’s catalog of his canonical modes of constitutional 
argument see BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 7–8. 
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not treat construction as a political project.154  Instead, construction is 
accomplished through techniques that articulate a constitutional principle 
expressed by the text, but in doing so interpret the constitutional principle in 
the contemporary world with our contemporary understandings—and 
contemporary values.155 
Balkin expressly contrasts his originalist approach with more traditional 
originalist approaches like that defended by Justice Scalia.156  The critical 
difference between the two originalisms is that Balkin asserts that the open-
ended provisions articulating principles were designed and intended to 
delegate the future participants in the Republic’s constitutional decision-
making the specification of these principles.157  Construction is thus the means 
to narrow the gap between originalism and its critics who endorse a Living 
Constitution—hence, Living Originalism.  
The New Originalists propose a variety of techniques to supply the 
additional legal content for such provisions to provide the requisite guidance 
for decision.158  Whittington claims that such terms cannot be given meaning 
by the courts because determining the meaning of such uninterpretable 
provisions requires political choices to be made.159  Political, in this context, 
means that normative choices must be made between competing claims with 
disparate impact on various members of political society.160  In our democratic 
Republic, those choices are to be made through the democratic political 
process.  Barnett’s methods of construction look to the principles inherent in 
the Constitution.161  But those principles are strongly libertarian and sharply 
                                                 
154  BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 148, at 5–8. 
155  Id. at 7. 
156  Id.  Balkin, like Dworkin, asserts that Justice Scalia endorsed an original 
application originalism rather than an original understandings originalism.  Id.  This 
claim, whatever its merits, is a red herring.  
157  Id.  
158  Compare WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 118, at 
1–15 (characterizing construction as a matter of making political choices) with 
BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23, at 122 (characterizing construction by its role in 
advancing the process of adjudication and emphasizing the natural rights dimension 
of much of that project) and BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 148, at 3–6 
(following Barnett in emphasizing the necessary role of construction in constitutional 
decision but without the natural rights dimension). 
159 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 118, at 7 
(“[C]onstitutional construction is essentially political.”); WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 118, at 1–15. 
160 See generally WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 
118, at 1 (expressly referring to the construction of constitutional law through the 
“political melding of the [Constitution] with external interests and principles”). 
161 BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23. 
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critical of the modern administrative state, which is now a part of the 
Republic.162 
As explored above, Jack Balkin adopts a third method of construction, 
purportedly attending to principles inherent in the Constitution and the 
Republic that it constitutes.163  The Constitution that Balkin constructs is very 
different from Barnett’s, however, because his method takes a favorable stance 
toward the modern administrative state of the Republic.164  Balkin articulates 
a somewhat different limitation on the role of interpretation.165  When the 
constitutional text is express and its meaning can be made clear through 
interpretation, Balkin privileges that interpretation as a ground for 
constitutional decision.166  He does so on the basis that only the original 
meaning of the constitutional text preserves the foundation for the structure of 
the Republic that the Constitution has created.167 
One question about the distinction between provisions that require 
interpretation and those that require construction is how clear the line between 
the two must be.  Even proponents of the concept of construction acknowledge 
that the line separating it from interpretation may blur.168  One possible 
response to my criticism is that I am simply asking for the distinction between 
construction and interpretation to be crystalline in a way that it is not and need 
not be.  I do not mean to assert here that an imprecise line is no line.  The 
argument I mean to make against the distinction between interpretation and 
construction is that no such distinction appears tenable.  The distinction is 
untenable because the need for interpretation or construction is not determined 
by the nature of the language of the constitutional text.  
The ontological distinction between the two classes of provisions has an 
epistemological corollary: we can distinguish the two classes with sufficient 
confidence to deploy the appropriate constitutional decision tools appropriate 
for the particular category into which any particular provision falls.  The New 
Originalists sometimes seem to suggest this classification is obvious because 
they do not pause to articulate how the distinction is to be drawn.169  On this 
account, the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment are manifestly abstract, requiring articulation 
                                                 
162 Id. 
163 BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 148, at 5. 
164 Id. 
165 See id. at 4–5. 
166 Id. at 14. 
167 Id. at 35–36. 
168 BARNETT, LOST, supra note 23, at 128. 
169 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 118, 
at 7; Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, supra note 12; Solum, Distinction, 
supra note 12, at 7; Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, supra note 12. 
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before they can be applied in particular cases; the requirement that the 
president be at least 35 years in age, by contrast, carries a precise meaning.  
The New Originalists all argue or assume that the distinction between 
construction and interpretation is semantically sound and epistemologically 
accessible.170  Armed with that distinction, the New Originalists argue that the 
criticism of classical originalism for implausibly assuming that all 
constitutional texts were interpretable and, therefore, “easy to discern and 
simple to apply,”171 has been disarmed.  But that claim relies upon the 
distinction being adequately drawn and knowable by constitutional judges.  I 
will explore the critics’ response to those claims below. 
C. The Critics’ Response 
 
Originalism’s critics sometimes share originalism’s commitment to the 
priority and primacy of interpretation in their account of constitutional 
decision.172  But when they do, they generally employ a different notion of 
interpretation.173  Dworkin asserts the priority and primacy of interpretation in 
constitutional decision.  In Dworkin’s account of interpretation, the law, 
including constitutional law, is interpreted in a manner that maintains its 
integrity while also taking into account the normative judgments of our best 
moral theory. 174  Thus, Dworkin’s project of interpretation is very different 
than that of the originalist.  But it is not only Dworkin’s idiosyncratic concept 
of interpretation that is different from that of the originalists.  Laurence Tribe 
also adopts very different methods of constitutional interpretation.175 
                                                 
170 If the distinction were not semantically sound and knowable, it could not do the 
task to which it is put: distinguishing constitutional provisions that may be given 
determinate meaning through interpretation and those that require the more open-
ended techniques of construction.  The originalists must assume those features in the 
absence of argument.  
171 SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, note 2, at 45. 
172 See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 73–80 (describing the problem 
of generality).  But see BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 7–8 (describing a typology 
of constitutional argument with several forms going beyond interpretation); 
PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 9, at 135–38 (endorsing a modal account of 
constitutional argument); Sunstein, Nothing, supra note 4 (arguing that substantive 
normative choices must be made among competing kinds of constitutional interpretive 
methods before those methods can be employed to produce readings of the 
Constitution). 
173 As noted above, my focus is not on the pragmatist claims of the critics. 
174 See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18, at 96–98. 
175 See generally TRIBE, INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 9; TRIBE & 
DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 6–13.  
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Tribe’s theory of constitutional interpretation is difficult to capture 
precisely, as he effectively acknowledges.176  Unlike some substantively 
similar constitutional theorists, Tribe appears to believe that constitutional 
decision begins with interpretation of the Visible Constitution.177  Most 
fundamentally, he argues that multiple interpretative methods must be 
deployed to work with the disparate types of constitutional provisions.178  His 
slogan, “Integration without hyper-integration,” captures his interpretative 
aspirations.179  Tribe’s methods of interpretation are, in substantial part, a 
response to his claim that interpretation faces a threshold question of 
determining the generality at which to interpret a constitutional provision.180  
The less general, more specific constitutional provisions are easier to interpret.  
For these specific provisions, understanding their semantic meaning is often 
enough.181  For the more general, aspirational provisions, by contrast, the 
Court’s task is somewhat harder.  For those provisions, Tribe urges that 
interpretation requires a normative judgment or choice.182  That normative 
judgment is based upon extra-constitutional sources. Tribe argues that our 
contemporary understandings inform the interpretation and application of 
these open-ended constitutional provisions.183  He gives the example of Brown 
v. Board of Education’s consideration of the question whether segregated 
public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause.184  Conceding that the 
Clause was not understood at the time of adoption to prohibit such schools, he 
concludes easily that by 1954 the application of the Clause to prohibit such 
segregation was a correct interpretation and application.185 
Originalism’s critics have been generally unimpressed by the New 
Originalists’ introduction of the interpretation/construction distinction.186  
They have argued that the distinction has little changed the evidence adduced 
                                                 
176 Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 72–73 (acknowledging that his theory of 
constitutional interpretation cannot be reduced to a “sound bite”). 
177 TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 71–73, 72 (“[I]t is primarily in the 
interpretation of prior cases that the battle for constitutional meaning is joined.”). 
178 Id. at 30 (citing Walt Whitman to emphasize the fundamental tensions, if not 
inconsistencies, inherent in the Constitution). 
179 TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 58–60.  But see TRIBE, INVISIBLE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 9. 
180 Id. at 73–80. 
181 Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 77 (“[S]ome parts of the Constitution 
cannot plausibly be open to significantly different interpretations.”). 
182 Id. at 87–94. 
183 Id. 
184 TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 12–13. 
185 Id. 
186 See, e.g., Tushnet, New Originalism, supra note 13. 
84       UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 16, No. 1 
 
for originalist interpretations.187  There is substantial reason to question the 
epistemic claim that we can distinguish those provisions that may be 
interpreted and those that require construction.188  The first reason is that the 
sources of uncertainty for the constitutional texts are contingent and historical; 
they evolve over time.  Thus, for example, the meaning of the Second 
Amendment likely appeared to be well-settled prior to District of Columbia v. 
Heller189 and, certainly, prior to the academic revisionist analysis beginning in 
the late 1980’s.190  The first clause of the Amendment was read as limiting the 
right; the scope of the constitutional right to bear arms was therefore quite 
narrow.191  The constitutional text needed only interpretation, not construction.  
Today, in light of Heller and McDonald v. Chicago,192 which read the first 
clause only as prefatory and without limiting effect, construction seems 
required to articulate the limits of constitutional firearm regulation.193  The 
Court has recognized that the right to bear arms is not absolute, either as to the 
kind of arms permitted or the locations to which they may be carried but 
articulating the relevant limits—which appears to require a normative choice 
for which the constitutional text provides little guidance—appears to be a 
matter of construction. 
Second, moreover, the sources of uncertainty and ambiguity are varied, 
and are not identifiable simply by inspecting the kinds of terms used in the 
relevant provision.  The judgment as to the classification of a particular text, 
and the methods properly available to a judge facing a case as to which the text 
appears relevant must look beyond the linguistic meaning of the text to the 
performative role the text plays to determine how to approach it.  This 
approach will turn on the constitutional doctrine that has arisen, the precedents 
                                                 
187 Tushnet, New Originalism, supra note 13, at 612 (“[P]roponents of the new 
originalism acknowledge, or at least should acknowledge, that nearly everything 
examined by old originalists is relevant to the new originalist inquiry.”). 
188 Laurence Tribe made this point forcefully at Princeton in criticism of both 
Dworkin and Justice Scalia.  Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 72 (“Both [Scalia 
and Dworkin] err, I think, in the confidence of their conclusions . . . .”).  
189 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (striking down the 
District of Columbia firearms regulatory statute while affirming that certain kinds of 
regulation would be permissible). 
190 See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE 
L.J. 637 (1989) [hereinafter Levinson, Second Amendment] (calling out the legal 
academy’s virtual disregard of the Second Amendment and suggesting that the 
Amendment might have more substance than had been generally acknowledged). 
191 Justice Scalia acknowledged this established reading of the Second Amendment 
in his Tanner Lectures at Princeton.  See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 
43 (suggesting that the Second Amendment would be found to guarantee only the right 
of the states to maintain a national guard). 
192 McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S 742 (2010). 
193 Id.; Heller, 554 U.S. at 573–78. 
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that may be relevant, and prudential concerns that may be applicable to the 
case at bar.  In some cases, a reading that is supported by a seemingly powerful 
interpretation will be unpersuasive because of extratextual concerns, be they 
structural, doctrinal, or prudential, for example.  There can be no algorithm to 
tell a judge when interpretation is enough and when construction is 
necessary.194  
The introduction of the concept of constitutional construction and the 
powerful role it has been accorded by its proponents has been criticized even 
by originalists.195  Richard Kay argues that the claim that construction is 
necessary to articulate constitutional authority outside the Constitution is 
mistaken.196  According to Kay, the Constitution incorporates the source of all 
constitutional law.197  Kay asserts that constitutional construction need not 
draw upon extra constitutional sources both because recourse to such authority 
is unnecessary and because it is impermissible as a matter of constitutional 
theory.198  He holds that it is unnecessary because it is apparently made 
necessary only by the excessively restrictive conditions that the New 
Originalism places on interpretation.199  If we adopt interpretative methods that 
go beyond the narrow set permitted by New Originalism and consider not 
merely what was understood to be meant by the constitutional language but 
was understood to be done by the text, then it will be possible to answer a 
broader range of questions.200  Here, I think Kay is right; in my terms, he is 
proposing interpreting the Constitution as a performative text.  It is 
impermissible because the purportedly originalist proponents of construction 
acknowledge that it creates binding constitutional law beyond that understood 
at the time the Constitution was adopted and the relevant amendment was 
passed.201  That accretion is inconsistent with originalism. 
                                                 
194 This is a corollary of the anti-foundational pluralist account of constitutional 
law I have defended elsewhere.  See generally André LeDuc, The Anti-Foundational 
Challenge to the Philosophical Premises of the Debate over Originalism, 119 PENN. 
ST. L. REV. 131 (2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge]. 
195 Kay, Constitutional Construction, supra note 5. 
196 Id. at 14–25. 
197 Id. at 2 (“For the purposes of constitutional adjudication, the Constitution is 
complete.”). 
198 Id. at 23–25; see also SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 44–45 
(arguing against looking beyond the original understanding of the constitutional text 
to moral theory because of the indeterminacy that would result in constitutional law). 
199 Kay, Constitutional Construction, supra note 5, at 12–13. 
200 Id. at 13–15. 
201 Id. at 11–12. 
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Moreover, most of originalism’s critics do not disagree with the central 
and foundational role accorded interpretation by originalism.202  Most 
dramatically, Ronald Dworkin argues that law is interpretation.203  By this he 
means that constitutional decision is a matter of forging the best interpretation 
of the authoritative sources of law, taking into account not only traditional 
legal authorities but also moral theory.204  Dworkin doesn’t disagree with the 
originalists about the priority of interpretation; he disagrees with them about 
the interpretation that they defend.205  Similarly, Tribe endorses the priority of 
interpretation in constitutional analysis, as a matter of understanding and 
decision.206  Again, he doesn’t disagree as to the place and role of 
interpretation; he disagrees about the interpretation defended by 
originalism,207 as well as the interpretative method defended by originalism.208  
Importantly, for example, Tribe asserts that the originalists are committed to 
the proposition that the Constitution may be interpreted within its four corners, 
and that this claim is false.209  Instead, Tribe holds that interpreters must bring 
to the task of interpretation extraneous material.210  But Tribe does not 
challenge the claim that the project of constitutional understanding and 
decision begins with interpretation.211   
Not all critics of originalism share the premise that interpretation is 
logically prior to constitutional decision, however.212  The pragmatists assign 
priority to prudential considerations in decision, so that the consequences of 
decision are paramount instead of the interpretations that may be articulated 
with respect to a constitutional text.213  Philip Bobbitt and Dennis Patterson 
have challenged the priority accorded interpretation by the originalists and 
their critics on the grounds that the practices that comprise law are the 
                                                 
202 E.g. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18; Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 
65–66. 
203 See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18. 
204 Id. at 240–50. 
205 See generally Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 2, at 115–27. 
206 Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 65–66.  
207 Id. at 65–72. 
208 Id. at 66. 
209 See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 81–87. 
210 Id. at 82–87. 
211 Id. at 14–15 (emphasizing the need for principles of interpretation with which 
to anchor the meaning of the Constitution).   
212 Michael Moore has challenged the priority accorded interpretation on the 
grounds that interpretative claims carry embedded ontological and other philosophical 
claims.  See generally Moore, Interpretive Turn, supra note 14. 
213 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 4. 
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discourse of arguments made within the constraints of accepted modes.214  On 
that account, argument, not interpretation, is the path to decision.215  Moreover, 
not all arguments are made on the basis of anything that can easily be cast as 
an interpretation.216  
Nevertheless, originalism and most of its critics share the premise that 
constitutional decision requires, as a condition precedent, an interpretation of 
the constitutional text, and much of the debate over originalism has unfolded 
on that ground.217  Both sides accord a logical priority to interpretation.218  The 
claim that interpretation is prior to constitutional decision is not 
uncontroversial and is likely mistaken.  The interpretive premise of originalism 
and most of its critics is subject to three criticisms.  First, originalism’s 
commitment to the logical priority of interpretation may be challenged.  
Second, the claim that appellate constitutional adjudication, after the facts have 
been found, is exclusively a matter of interpretation may be challenged.  Third, 
the claim that constitutional law is a fundamentally or exclusively a text that 
is to be interpreted in adjudication may also be rejected.  I will look at each of 
these increasingly radical challenges in turn. 
Because of the prevalence of the interpretive model in our contemporary 
accounts of constitutional adjudication, the alternatives to that model may not 
be immediately apparent.  How would constitutional adjudication work if it 
did not begin with an interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions?  
Application need not be derivative of interpretation.  We may simply apply a 
rule without need for interpreting it.219  Making an argument derived from 
Wittgenstein’s analysis of rule-following, originalism’s critics rely both upon 
our intuitions of what it is like to follow a rule and the more theoretical 
arguments that an infinite regress results if we posit that an interpretation of a 
rule is required as a precondition for the application of a rule.220  Applied to 
                                                 
214 See, e.g., BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 88, at 11–22; BOBBITT, FATE, 
supra note 14, at 3–8; PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 9, at 151–79; Patterson, 
Interpretation, supra note 18. 
215 See, e.g., BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 3–8; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, 
supra note 88, at 11–22.  
216 Prudential arguments, for example, are not made on the basis of what the 
relevant text says as much as on the basis of what ought to be done.  See BOBBITT, 
FATE, supra note 14, at 59–73. 
217 E.g., DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, 
note 2.  See generally Moore, Interpretive Turn, supra note 14. 
218 E.g., DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 18; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, 
note 2, at 144–45. 
219 See generally WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, 
§§ 83–240. 
220 See, e.g., id. (sketching a series of arguments that rule following is an inherently 
social phenomenon); G. P. BAKER & P. M. S. HACKER, SCEPTICISM, RULES AND 
LANGUAGE (1983) (challenging the attribution of Kripke’s argument to Wittgenstein); 
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constitutional adjudication, this analysis would suggest that judges may simply 
apply the constitutional rule, and then use the associated opinion to explain 
their application.  Or, perhaps, judges may merely offer an ex post 
interpretation of the rule and its application.  What, then, is involved in or 
necessary for such an application of the constitutional rule? 
Perhaps the judge must simply grasp the constitutional rule.  Justice 
Black’s self-conscious constitutionalism, purportedly focusing on the “plain 
meaning” of the Constitution,221 and his account of reading the Constitution 
and then applying it, may appear to capture the notion that the constitutional 
rules may be applied without an intermediated interpretation.  The obvious 
difficulty with such an account is that the notion of grasping certain kinds of 
rules does not appear easily applicable to constitutional rules.  My intuition 
that such rules are different than the rules that we grasp “in a flash” is not easy 
to articulate.  While some of those rules appear simple (like the rule for 
addition), the model of understanding by an intuitive grasp has a broader scope 
in mathematics, for example, and would appear to extend to very complex 
mathematical truths (at least for sophisticated and able mathematicians) with 
a broader scope.222  There appear, at least initially, to be very substantial 
differences between the nature of the rules of addition, such as those chosen 
by Wittgenstein for his examples, and rules of constitutional law.223  Indeed, 
the way mathematicians often describe grasping even very complex and 
                                                 
SAUL KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE: AN ELEMENTARY 
EXPOSITION (1982) (controversial skeptical reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s 
discussion of rules, with an express qualification as to whether it ought to be attributed 
to Wittgenstein himself). 
221 For some appropriate and thoughtful qualifications about endorsing such an 
account of Justice Black’s constitutional theory, see ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, 
supra note 147, at 3 (pointing out that Justice Black’s constitutional theory was much 
more nuanced and sophisticated than Black presented it to be or than it has been 
traditionally recognized to be); Lessig, Translation, supra note 63, at 1165, n.25 
(citing several of Justice Black’s important constitutional decisions expressing his 
plain meaning theory of constitutional interpretation). 
222 The role of sophistication in this account is itself not unproblematic, as George 
Hardy’s account of the introduction of the Indian mathematician into England’s 
mathematical elite makes clear.  See GEORGE H. HARDY, A MATHEMATICIAN’S 
APOLOGY (1940); see also MICHAEL HARRIS, MATHEMATICS WITHOUT APOLOGIES 
(2015) (contemporary account of work on the frontiers of modern mathematics’ 
research agenda); REBECCA GOLDSTEIN, THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM (1981) (fictional 
account of mathematical intuition).  But see NICOLAS BOURBAKI, GENERAL 
TOPOLOGY: CHAPTER 1–4 (1998) (indicative example of codifying axiomatic approach 
to pure mathematics).   
223 See generally WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, 
§§ 198–242 (providing examples of simple rules that are like the rule of addition, such 
as the rules of chess and the rule generating the series of odd integers). 
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difficult mathematical propositions appears more like grasping addition than 
grasping the scope of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment.  How would a modern judge “grasp” the constitutional 
rule against bills of attainder, for example?224 
Justice Black may appear to be a proponent of the position that the import 
of the plain meaning can provide the answers to constitutional questions, 
without need for interpretation or for argument.225  But as others have pointed 
out, Justice Black’s claim that constitutional decision can proceed in reliance 
upon only the text of the Constitution and its plain meaning, doesn’t hold up 
even as an account of Justice Black’s own jurisprudence.226  Even Justice 
Black needed a fuller account of the First Amendment, and the scope of the 
power of the state to restrict particular classes of speech, despite the apparently 
absolute language of the text.227 
One way to capture the discomfort here would be to invoke Dworkin’s 
distinction between rules and principles.228  On Dworkin’s account, principles 
are softer, less mechanical, and more powerful than rules.229  Moreover, 
principles are more highly articulated and more reasoned than rules in their 
application on that account.230  The constitutional provisions cited above 
appear more like principles than like rules.  While we may acknowledge that 
rules can be grasped without need for an intermediating interpretation, can we 
grasp principles in the same way?  The same arguments that Wittgenstein 
makes against the view that we need an interpretation of a rule to apply it 
would appear applicable to legal principles, too.  If we need an interpretation 
to apply a principle, then we would appear to need an interpretation of that 
interpretation, too.  One possible reply would be the argument that principles 
work differently from rules, and that we cannot grasp a principle in the same 
way we speak of grasping a rule.  Principles, on this characterization, cannot 
                                                 
224 Not by reading a law journal note like John Hart Ely’s (even if that permits her 
to understand that constitutional rule).  See John Hart Ely, The Bounds of Legislative 
Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330 
(1962).  I do not know whether the task would have been less difficult when the 
Constitution was adopted. 
225 See, e.g., ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 147 (acknowledging 
that Justice Black was often viewed as holding such absolute views, but expressing 
caution about that attribution). 
226 See id. at 3. 
227 As has been often pointed out, even Justice Black understood that the absolute 
prohibition on laws abridging free speech had exceptions for speech by those serving 
in the military and speech in the context of riot or insurrection. 
228 See DWORKIN, Rules I, supra note 29, at 22–23. 
229 Id. at 22. 
230 The abstract status of principles and their provenance in the realm of morality 
would appear to explain these differences.  See generally id. at 24–28. 
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be “grasped” in such a direct manner because of their complexity, softness, 
and articulation.  Principles, on this account, must be understood through 
articulation and in application.  It is not enough to apply a principle; it must be 
articulable inferentially, explaining the arguments that support it, and 
explaining the consequences that follow from it.  The role of interpretation on 
this account is to tease out this inferential context of the principle; that’s 
arguably a different role than the interpretations that have been posited as prior 
to and necessary for the interpretation of a rule, and then criticized by 
Wittgenstein and others.231  Working out the implications of, and proper 
inferences from, a constitutional text does not appear to be merely a matter of 
interpretation.232   
It is also possible that constitutional provisions are neither rules nor 
principles.  If we bear in mind the performative nature of the Constitution, we 
should not be surprised that there are a variety of performative techniques 
available.  The Constitution may sometimes be understood as providing a 
framework within which constitutional rights are to be protected.  The First 
Amendment prohibition on the enactment of any law abridging the freedom of 
the press on this perspective is neither wholly a rule nor wholly a principle.233  
Instead, it is a directive that the rights of a free press are of fundamental 
importance.  That doesn’t mean it is permissible to cry “Fire!” in a crowded 
theater,234 or that the rights of a free press are to be balanced against other 
unidentified values.  The artificial dichotomy between rules and principles 
doesn’t do justice either to the text of the First Amendment or to the 
constitutional doctrine that has evolved thereunder. 
Originalists cannot move easily beyond the artificial dichotomy between 
rules and principles however, because it would add a complexity to the account 
of language at odds with the formalism of their account.  Such a distinction 
would require an account that describes how interpretation may move from the 
constitutional text to the principle inherent in that text.235  But such a move is 
available to critics.  If constitutional provisions are not statements of rules or 
principles, an alternative characterization may be that they are statements of 
                                                 
231 See, e.g., WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, §§ 
83–240. 
232 On Solum’s account, for example, the task described is a matter of determining 
legal content, not interpreting communicative content. Solum, Communicative 
Content, supra note 102, at 480–83.   
233 U.S. CONST. amend. I.   
234 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).   
235 Of course, this challenge is already present for the originalists with respect to 
texts like that of the First Amendment.  But originalists have taken pains to adopt 
opaque accounts of the interpretative process for such texts. See SCALIA, 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 38 (characterizing the First Amendment as “a sort 
of synecdoche”). 
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aspirations.236  Another possibility is that the relationship judges have with 
constitutional texts is that of making arguments or defending outcomes with 
those texts.  On this account, which I defend in a companion article in this 
series, judges don’t offer interpretations of texts, they offer arguments for 
outcomes in constitutional adjudication based upon the text, or perhaps, based 
upon other modes of argument.237  Interpretation is not the end of 
constitutional adjudication; it is only one of its means.  This is the familiar 
radical critique of the anti-representationalists like Bobbitt and Patterson.238  
A final approach toward interpretation has been recently sketched by Cass 
Sunstein.239  Sunstein approaches interpretation from his commitment to 
judicial minimalism, intent to disarm interpretation as a method that might 
legitimate a more principled approach to constitutional decision.240  Sunstein 
asserts that there are competing models of constitutional interpretation and that 
the choice among them—which has implications for the substantive 
constitutional doctrine that is derived through interpretation—is itself a 
substantive normative choice.241  Put somewhat simply, there is not a canonical 
interpretive method that can derive a neutral constitutional interpretation.   
The originalists take as a foundational premise that constitutional appellate 
adjudication is principally a matter of interpretation.  That premise may be 
criticized from a number of vantages, which remain largely unaddressed by 
the originalists.  I have previously explored the pragmatist challenge, but here 
my focus has been upon alternative characterizations of the nature of the 
adjudicative activity and of the constitutional text itself.  An exclusive 
interpretative account of constitutional adjudication is inadequate.  First, the 
argument for interpretation from the purported logical priority of interpretation 
cannot be sustained.  Consequences, both in the space of causes and in the 
space of reasons, would appear properly part of the Supreme Court’s 
deliberative and decisional mission.  Second, it is unpersuasive to think that 
such considerations in the constitutional sphere have been cabined by the 
Constitution to only the amendatory processes of Article V.  It is more 
plausible that such considerations should be entertained by the Congress in 
                                                 
236 See generally Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 80 (so characterizing the 
First Amendment).  But see SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 134.  In 
Dworkin’s theory, while aspirations may shape legal principles, a mere aspiration does 
not constitute a legal principle. 
237 See generally LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 6; LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge, supra note 194. 
238 See, e.g., BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 88, at 24; PATTERSON, TRUTH, 
supra note 9, at 136–38. 
239 Sunstein, Nothing, supra note 4. 
240 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 
13–34 (1996) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING]. 
241 Sunstein, Nothing, supra note 4, at 193–94. 
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legislation and by the Court in adjudication.  Third and finally, a more careful 
attention to the text of the Constitution and its role in both saying and in doing 
also makes a reduction of constitutional adjudication to interpretation 
implausible.  These arguments are largely unaddressed by originalism, in part 
because originalists take the nature of the text and the judicial mission as given 
and so accord neither much scrutiny.242   
Interpretation is not logically prior to the application of the Constitution’s 
provisions.  The Constitution may be applied without interpretation.  But that 
is not to say that we may dispense with interpretation.  Interpretation, both by 
the courts and by the commentators, plays a role in our constitutional law.  
Interpretations may support arguments and so are an important part of the ways 
in which decisions are justified and explained.  I explore both of those 
constitutional functions in more detail in Striding Out of Babel.243  
Interpretation is an element in our constitutional practice of argument and 
justification.  It is not, however, logically prior to decision.   
Finally, any alternative account of constitutional adjudication that rejects 
the priority and primacy of interpretation ought to explain why interpretation 
exercises such a powerful appeal as an account of constitutional decision.  
Interpretive accounts have a pervasive role in our intellectual culture and the 
public space of reason.244  Interpretation is an established and powerful model 
for understanding an array of social practice.245  But the appeal of 
interpretation goes beyond those common grounds; the theory of constitutional 
decision as beginning with interpretation of the constitutional text has a 
particular jurisprudential appeal for many.  That appeal is itself grounded in 
the ontological premises about the Constitution that the participants in the 
debate generally share.246 
III.  COMPETING ACCOUNTS OF PRACTICAL REASONING IN OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
 
The preceding discussion has explored an account of interpretation that 
figures in the originalism debate.  This section explores those accounts at a 
higher level of abstraction as accounts of constitutional reasoning.  We will 
see that even when the protagonists share a concept of constitutional decision 
as a matter of interpretation, their tacit accounts of constitutional reasoning are 
very different. 
                                                 
242 See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 37–38 (diving directly into 
the task of interpretation without pausing to place that project of interpretation in any 
context of adjudication). 
243 LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 6. 
244 See generally Moore, Interpretive Turn, supra note 14, at 872–73.  
245 See generally id.  
246 See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31. 
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A. Originalism’s Formal Account of Constitutional Reasoning 
 
Originalism offers a formalistic account of constitutional reasoning.247  By 
formalistic, I mean that the originalist account values stating legal propositions 
as rules rather than as principles or standards,248 and values clear rules, at least 
in certain cases, more highly than just outcomes.249  Clear rules permit 
reasonable reliance and planning in socio-legal relations and restrict judicial 
discretion.  Originalism’s formalism, to the extent it reduces law to rules, faces 
obvious challenges when applied to the language of the text of the 
Constitution.250  The linguistic styles of the various provisions of the 
Constitution and its Amendments appear to vary significantly.251  Originalists 
have not generally been fair in acknowledging or responding to this 
challenge.252  Originalism’s formalism has two principal components, one 
largely tacit, and the other express.  First, the tacit premise of originalism is 
                                                 
247 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 261–65.  Some have contraposed 
originalism and formalism.  See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, 
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter FARBER & SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING] 
(characterizing Bork as an originalist and Justice Scalia as a formalist).  That strategy 
appears problematic, because both Robert Bork and Justice Scalia, as well as many 
other originalists, adopt a formal account of constitutional reasoning and, on the 
account defended here, that formalism is an important argument for the stronger claims 
of originalism. 
248 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 
(1989) [hereinafter Scalia, Rules] (arguing that our concept of the rule of law 
incorporates a principle of equal justice pursuant to which justice is rendered not on a 
particularized, ad hoc basis but on a uniform basis through the application of general 
principles or rules).  
249 This is not intended as a novel definition of formalism.  For a classic exploration 
of formality and formalism in the private law context, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); see also 
Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 155 (1981) (“The 
formalist theory of adjudication asserts that legal disputes can be, and should be, and 
are resolved by recourse to legal rules and principles, and the facts of each particular 
dispute.” (footnote omitted)); POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 9, at 14–16 (describing 
legal formalists as committed to the existence of legal principles underlying the 
decisional law which, when identified, can furnish premises for deductive derivations 
of the correct answer to new cases).   
250 See, e.g., Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 86–89. 
251 Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, clauses 5 & 8 (specifying the minimum age 
of the President and prescribing the oath that he must swear), with U.S. CONST. amend. 
VIII (prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishments”).  But see SCALIA, 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 135 (rejecting Tribe’s claim that some constitutional 
provisions are “aspirational”). 
252 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, note 2, at 134–36. 
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that the meaning of constitutional words, and, thus, of constitutional 
provisions, is generally straightforward.253  Originalism offers a formal 
account of the linguistic meaning of the Constitution,254 and assumes that 
words picture the world.255  Originalism’s task is simply to uncover the 
semantic understandings at the time of the relevant adoption or amendment of 
the constitutional provision.  Second, originalism’s account of constitutional 
reasoning asserts, expressly, that constitutional reasoning largely follows the 
syllogistic reasoning of formal Aristotelian logic.256  This formal account of 
constitutional interpretation is defended by originalists in part because of its 
promise to deliver a science of interpretation, with the same kinds of 
confidence relied upon as the natural sciences.257   
Originalism offers an Aristotelian model of reasoning to characterize the 
proper method of judicial reasoning in constitutional interpretation.258  The 
syllogistic model of judicial reasoning begins with the derivation of a major 
premise from (the original meaning of) the text of the Constitution.  That major 
premise typically has the form of a legal principle like: “All X are p.”259  The 
minor premise is furnished from the facts of the case at hand.  That minor 
premise would typically be of the form “A is an X.” Basic logic yields the 
conclusion that decides the case, or states the premise for a further inference.  
It follows then that “A is p”, and judgment is rendered.  Thus, the Aristotelian 
syllogism, constructed in this manner from the constitutional text, is the 
paradigm of constitutional adjudication for the originalist.   
                                                 
253 See id. at 45 (“Often—indeed I dare say usually—[the original understanding 
of the text] is easy to discern and simple to apply.”).  Some of the certainty as to the 
meanings of words and texts arises from overlooking the natural and almost instinctive 
use of context and implicature to help provide those meanings.   
254 See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31. 
255 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 3. 
256 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 262.  Bork’s originalism might be 
defended on the basis that allowances ought to be made for occasional stylistic 
excesses.  Bork’s characterization of constitutional reasoning as described by formal 
logic would be tempered in the same way that his occasional claim that originalism is 
necessarily true is best read.  But because the formality of Bork’s characterization is 
central to his claim for the certainty provided by originalism, it does not appear 
possible to excise or reconstruct that claim. 
257 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 3 (“The following essay 
attempts to explain the current neglected state of the science of construing legal texts, 
and offers a few suggestions for improvement.”); see also Richard M. Rorty, The 
Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, in PRAGMATISM IN LAW AND 
SOCIETY 89, 91 (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991) (“Nobody wants to talk 
about a ‘science of law’ anymore.”).   
258 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 162–63. 
259 The model of the syllogism is expressly endorsed and adopted by leading 
originalists.  See id. at 252–57. 
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Originalism does not defend its account directly.  When Justice Scalia 
distinguished the nature of constitutional argument and reasoning from the 
common law methods, he does so on the basis that the common law methods 
are inconsistent with democratic sovereignty.260  The argument from 
democratic sovereignty is a structural argument, based upon the separation of 
powers in the Constitution and the allocation of legislative power to Congress, 
with a modest role accorded to the President.  On Justice Scalia’s account, the 
common law judge makes law in a manner inconsistent with that allocation of 
the legislative function to Congress.261  From that charge, Justice Scalia 
concluded that only a formal interpretative method is proper.262 
Justice Scalia’s argument was too facile.  First, common law was not 
thought to be inconsistent with, or an affront to, the sovereign.263  Instead, 
common law tradition was thought consistent with the authority of the 
sovereign because of the principle of separation of powers that no person—
including the sovereign—should be a judge in her own case.264  Moreover, the 
survival of the common law tradition and practice within the constitutional law 
of the new democratic republic appears well established.265  The separation of 
powers and the democratic republican structure of the United States was not 
understood to circumscribe the role or the reasoning of the courts in the new 
nation.266   
Justice Scalia’s conclusion as to the scope of the methods of reasoning 
permitted appears unfounded.   It is unclear that the interpretative methods to 
which Justice Scalia would limit constitutional judges are the only methods 
that a sovereign might choose for judges acting on its behalf.  The choice 
between what a provision was understood to mean and what it was intended to 
                                                 
260 SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 9. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
263 That was in part because common judges were understood to be agents of the 
sovereign.  See generally GARY L. MCDOWELL, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (2010) [hereinafter MCDOWELL, 
LANGUAGE OF LAW].   
264 See generally id. at 248–52; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (1788) (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
265 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION (1998) (describing the common law provenance of the express 
protections of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments). 
266 See id.; MCDOWELL, LANGUAGE OF LAW, supra note 263, at 343–78 
(describing Justice Story’s central contribution to harmonizing the common law 
tradition flowing from Blackstone with the political and legal theory of 
constitutionalism). 
96       UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 16, No. 1 
 
do, for example, is not an obvious choice for a sovereign.267  More importantly, 
the question of whether to follow the original understanding of a provision or 
to follow what is understood at the time the future decision is made presents a 
choice for a sovereign.  Similarly, whether to require formal logical reasoning 
or to permit a wider array of argument and reasoning also present choices that 
do not have obvious answers for a sovereign.  Thus, the conclusion that Justice 
Scalia wants to draw from his premise appears equally as unsupported as the 
premise itself.   
The formal account of constitutional reasoning raises a number of 
questions as to what counts as proper types of arguments.  Are inductive and 
empirical arguments and the other kinds of legal arguments made in the 
common law proper?  Common law reasoning is not formalistic.268  Reasoning 
from analogy, deriving reasoned principles from disparate decisional law, and 
generalizing principles to serve as premises for arguments—not necessarily 
syllogistic in form—for conclusions as to how a case should be decided are 
important in common law.269  Common law reasoning is inductive and 
inferential,270 and is inconsistent with the formal model of originalism.  Justice 
Scalia makes one of the clearest statements of the limits of permissible 
constitutional argument based upon an argument from a theory of democratic 
republican sovereignty.271  He emphasizes the creative role of common law 
arguments: recognizing principles, articulating the direction inherent in a line 
of cases, and building a foundation for a decision to make new law.272  
According to Justice Scalia’s argument, common law methods permit judges 
to make law.273  The creative role of judicial decision-making arrogates a law-
making function to the judiciary that is inconsistent with our democratic 
republic, according to Justice Scalia.274  Thus, anything but the formal mode 
of syllogistic argument from the major premises stated by the constitutional 
text is improper.275 
                                                 
267 Original understandings would better capture what a sovereign meant by a 
statutory or constitutional provision, but prudential or structural arguments might 
produce results more in keeping with what the sovereign would prefer. 
268 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 3–9. 
269 See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (2009). 
270 See id.; BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19–21 
(1921) (“The sentence of today will make the right and wrong of tomorrow.”); OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881) 
(“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”). 
271 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 9. 
272 Id. at 6–9. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 9. 
275 Id. at 37–41. 
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The originalists’ formal account of constitutional reasoning thus grounds 
its criticism of common law reasoning in constitutional interpretation and 
decision.276  Originalists criticize common law methods as violating the 
fundamental political and legal premises of our democratic republic by giving 
judges too much power.277  Originalism’s model looks to the provisions of the 
Constitution to provide the major premises for formal logical deductions, 
while the minor premise comes from the case at bar.278  By describing 
constitutional reasoning as formal in this logical sense, originalism purports to 
limit the kinds of arguments that may properly be made in constitutional 
argument, the kinds of propositions that may be taken as the starting point for 
inferences, and limited the role of judicial judgment in constitutional 
decision.279  Thus, the formal account of constitutional reasoning provides a 
key element for the originalist project of cabining judicial discretion.   
The formality of originalism and the model of syllogistic reasoning does 
not appear an accurate description of the legal reasoning in constitutional 
decisions.  For example, in Brown, the question before the Court was whether 
segregated public schools violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.280  Certainly, the Court did not approach the question 
as if the major premise of the syllogism was clear and only the minor premise 
was to be determined.281  Rather, the Court’s argument was more informal and 
it was cognizant that a finding for the plaintiff would likely run counter to the 
expectations of those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.282   
Moreover, originalism’s account of constitutional reasoning is not easily 
reconciled with the methodology that the originalists actually deploy.  Even in 
strongly originalist opinions like the Court’s in Heller283 and Citizens 
United,284 the dissent in Boumediene,285 and the concurrence in Adarand 
                                                 
276 See id. at 13–14.   
277 Id. at 9–14. 
278 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 46; BORK, TEMPTING, supra 
note 7, at 261–64. 
279 See Fried, Judgment, supra note 34 (emphasizing the role of judgment in 
constitutional adjudication and the necessity to account for that important role in our 
constitutional theory). 
280 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954). 
281 Id. at 492–96.  
282 Id. at 492–93 (Warren, C.J., writing for a unanimous Court) (asserting that the 
case must be decided on the basis of the realities of free public education at the time 
of decision). 
283 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Scalia, J., writing for the 
majority). 
284 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (Kennedy, J., writing for the 
majority). 
285 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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Constructors,286 the reasoning cannot be easily reduced to, or translated into, 
a series of syllogisms.287 Instead, the reasoning is far more fluid and informal, 
and far more casually inferential in its argument.288  
In Heller, the Court tested a stringent District of Columbia firearm 
regulatory regime under the Second Amendment.289  It is not easy to assimilate 
the reasoning of that case to a syllogism.290  The Court first articulated what 
the Second Amendment meant.291  After examining the subsequent 
interpretation of the Second Amendment, including the Court’s own 
precedents, the Court applied the Second Amendment to the District of 
Columbia ordinance in question.292  The argument of the opinion advanced a 
long series of propositions, which are not easily restated in syllogistic form.293  
                                                 
286 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and in the judgment). 
287 The difficulty in reducing the argument to such a series of syllogisms arises 
from the more complex structure of the argument itself, as articulated by Stephen 
Toulmin and Dennis Patterson, and also from the tacit premises that are accepted both 
by the Court and by its intended audience.  The structure of the argument is neither as 
explicit nor as simple as a series of syllogisms might suggest. 
288 Moreover, much such practical reasoning also employs modal and probabilistic 
elements.  See generally DONALD DAVIDSON, How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?, 
in DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 36–40 (1980) (defending an 
account of the logical structure of practical reasoning to account for akratic action); 
CARL G. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION (1965).   
289 Heller, 554 U.S. at 573. 
290 Id. at 577.  The Court announced a series of key premises without argument or 
defense, proceeding to rely on, and reason from, those premises.  Thus the Court stated 
that “[t]he Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts” and that “[l]ogic 
demands that there be a link between the stated purpose and the command.”  Id.  Note 
that the text of the Second Amendment hardly states that the first clause states the 
purpose of the Amendment and that whatever may explain the relationship of the two 
clauses, it is not logic, as ordinarily understood. 
291 Id. at 576–603. 
292 Id. at 628–35. 
293 Propositions asserted by the Court in Heller that apparently factored into the 
holding (and thus are not mere dicta) include: 
HP1: The Second Amendment is divided into two parts. 
HP2: One part is its “prefatory clause.” 
HP3: One part is its “operative clause.” 
HP4: The Second Amendment could be restated: “Because X, Y.” 
HP5: The prefatory clause structure is unique in the Constitution. 
HP6: The prefatory clause structure was common in “other legal 
documents.” 
HP7: The prefatory clause structure was particularly common in 
individual-rights provisions of contemporaneous state constitutions.  
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For example, when the Court asserts that the Second Amendment has a 
“prefatory clause” and an “operative clause,” it is not apparent where those 
claims came from.294  Nor is the meaning of those claims apparent, because 
                                                 
HP8: Logic demands the existence of a “link” between the stated purpose 
and the command. 
HP9: The prefatory clause states the purpose. 
HP10: The operative clause states the command. 
HP11: The “first salient feature” of the operative clause is that it codifies. 
HP12: The operative clause codifies a right. 
HP13: The right codified by the operative clause is a right of “the people.” 
HP14: The unamended Constitution and the Bill of Rights use the locution 
“right of the people” in two other contexts. 
HP15: One context is the First Amendment. 
HP16: One context is the Fourth Amendment. (It is thus unstated that the 
unamended Constitution does not use this locution at all.) 
HP17: Justice Stevens criticizes the majority for discussing “the 
prologue” last. 
HP18: If a prologue can be used only to resolve ambiguity in an operative 
provision, then it is necessary to determine whether the operative 
provision is ambiguous first.  
HP19: There exists an argument that: “The prologue should be considered 
as ‘one of the factors’ in determining whether the operative provision is 
ambiguous.”  
HP20: If we considered the prologue as provided by HP19, then we would 
reach the same result. 
HP21: We would reach the same result because our interpretation of “the 
right of the people to keep and bear arms” furthers the purpose of an 
effective militia. 
HP22: Our interpretation furthers such purpose no less than the dissent’s 
interpretation furthers such purpose. 
HP23: Our interpretation furthers such purpose more than the dissent’s 
interpretation furthers such purpose. 
HP24: The Ninth Amendment uses terminology very similar to “right of 
the people.” 
HP25: All three formulations refer to individual rights. 
 All of these propositions appear in the first five pages of the sixty-four page slip 
opinion.  This very incomplete listing of the propositions that would need be taken 
into account in the Heller opinion confirms that the opinion does not fall into 
syllogistic form.  Moreover, as the simplified propositions themselves reveal, they are 
far from self-evident or unproblematic.  The model of the logical syllogism simply 
fails to capture the richness required in hard legal analysis.  Even in the hands of Justice 
Scalia, it’s not easily possible to reduce legal reasoning to such formality.  Holmes’s 
pragmatic slogan that the life of the law has been experience, not logic, is captured in 
the rich texts of opinions in novel and hard Constitutional questions—even for Justice 
Scalia.   
294 Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 577 (2008). 
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the import of designating a clause as prefatory or operative in a constitutional 
text is novel.  Thus, it is not clear how to fit those claims, as conclusions, into 
a syllogistic model.  
It is also not apparent how such claims fit into a syllogistic model as 
premises.  Justice Scalia intends his characterization of the initial clause as 
prefatory to strip that clause of legal effect.295  But there is no step in his 
argument that explains why status as a prefatory clause should have such 
effect.  Thus, the structure of his argument is both more informal and more 
complex.  The formalistic reduction of judicial reasoning to a series of 
syllogisms, at least with respect to the Court’s opinion in Heller, is not an 
accurate description of the originalist reasoning articulated by the Court.  
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court instead introduces claims based upon 
tacit assumptions about what readers will accept or endorse. Thus, for 
example, when he asserts that one part of the Second Amendment is a 
“prefatory clause” in HP2, he offers no argument for that claim.296  Despite the 
fundamental importance of that claim to set up his argument that the reference 
to the militia is without legal import, Justice Scalia simply makes the claim 
based upon the ambiguous syntactical structure of the text.297  But the syntax 
makes the claim plausible, whether or not true.   
The same exercise of outlining the structure of the operative sentences 
comprising the judicial decisional texts can be performed with other opinions 
of equally impeccable originalist pedigree.298  Non-originalist decisions are 
equally resistant to reduction to formal logic.  For example, Justice Breyer’s 
crisply reasoned dissent in Heller is not an argument expressed in syllogistic 
form, and cannot be easily translated into such form.299  It is important, 
                                                 
295 See id. at 578 (“[A] prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the 
operative clause.”). 
296 Id. at 577–78. 
297 Id. 
298 I analyze the reasoning of three recent, important constitutional cases in Beyond 
Babel.  See LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 6, at 197–220. 
299 A similar analysis of the salient propositions of Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Heller is no less easily cast in a syllogistic form: 
DP1: The Majority’s opinion is wrong for two independent reasons. 
DP2: One reason is set forth by Justice Stevens. 
DP3: The rights protected by the Second Amendment relate to militias. 
DP4: The second, independent reason is that the rights protected are not 
absolute. 
DP5: The Amendment permits the government to regulate the interests 
that the Amendment serves. 
DP6: The Majority can be correct only if it can show that the regulation is 
unreasonable or inappropriate. 
DP7: The majority cannot satisfy the requirement of DP6. 
2017  THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 101 
 
moreover, to remark the difference between how an opinion works for the 
Court and how a dissenting opinion is written.  Because an authoritative 
opinion of the Court states the law, it must make that statement more precisely 
than a dissenting opinion that serves more as an argument for a contrary result 
or approach.  A dissenting opinion can be more free-wheeling.300  Because 
dissents are not authoritative law, they do not need to be written as precisely 
and transparently as the legal rule that they would endorse if written as an 
opinion. 
Neither originalist nor non-originalist decisions generally reduce easily to 
a syllogism or a series of syllogisms.  If it were only non-originalist 
constitutional reasoning that did not conform to the formal originalist account, 
it might easily be argued that such nonconformity is further evidence that non-
originalist constitutional reasoning is improper or mistaken.  But the 
originalists’ formal account of constitutional reasoning fails to fit their own 
practice of reasoning, too.  It appears inadequate as a description of our 
practice of constitutional decisional reasoning. That inadequacy has important 
implications. 
                                                 
  DP8: Assume with the majority that the Amendment protects firearm 
ownership for self-defense. 
DP9: The Majority does not assume that the Amendment provides 
protection for a specific right to possess handguns with which to shoot 
burglars. 
DP10: That claim is indefensible. 
DP11: Colonial history presents examples of gun regulation. 
DP12: That regulation applied in urban areas. 
DP13: That regulation restricted the right to defend one’s home. 
DP14: The three largest cities at that time restricted the discharge of 
firearms at least to some degree. 
DP15: Restrictions on the storage of gunpowder would have precluded a 
citizen having a firearm that could be immediately discharged without 
loading. 
       DP16: The Majority criticizes my citation of these laws. 
       DP17: The Majority cannot deny their existence. 
DP18: The laws may have had an implied exception for self-defense. 
DP19: An argument to that effect can only be made on the basis of the 
statutes’ prefaces. 
DP20: The majority derides recourse to prefaces as a matter of 
interpretation. 
 Heller, 554 U.S. at 681–87.  Despite the crispness with which Justice Breyer 
articulates his argument, it is far from syllogistic, even if we begin with DP8, after the 
introduction of Justice Breyer’s opinion. 
300 It is no coincidence that Justice Scalia’s admirers have been most admiring of 
his dissenting opinions.  See, e.g., SCALIA DISSENTS: WRITINGS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT’S WITTIEST, MOST OUTSPOKEN JUSTICE (Kevin A. Ring ed., 2004). 
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Some originalists have attempted to broaden the scope of constitutional 
argument by distinguishing constitutional interpretation from constitutional 
construction.301  The former is the proper approach when the constitutional 
text speaks to the constitutional question at hand.302  The latter is proper when 
the constitution does not provide a governing provision.303  The methods 
permissible in constitutional construction (which apply to questions for which 
there is no determining constitutional text to be interpreted) are broader than 
the formal methods applicable in interpretation.304  Constitutional texts are not 
easily sorted into the two classes and, moreover, the distinction (to the extent 
that it is sensible) is often more a matter of degree than kind.  Moreover, many 
questions arise when constitutional provisions appear in tension, as with 
respect to the provision that the Vice President serves as the President of the 
Senate, and the express exception to that rule (only) for trials of the 
impeachment of the President.305  Thus, the New Originalists’ distinction 
between construction and interpretation raises important questions for the 
originalist project that the new originalists do not fully acknowledge.306   
The formality of the originalist model plays an important part in that 
theory.  Formality supports the certainty and focus that originalism seeks.307  
The model of adjudication confirms originalism’s narrow focus on sources and 
methods.  Originalism, having circumscribed the sources of law by its 
exclusive focus on the original meaning of the provisions, seeks also to 
preclude a consideration of the pragmatics of the application of the 
understanding for the case at hand, or a consideration of whether and how that 
                                                 
301 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 118, at 5–9. 
302 Id. 
303 Id. 
304 Id. at 3–9 (emphasizing the political choices that must be made in construction); 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 55, at 7–13. 
305 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
306 The new originalists acknowledge these questions tacitly when they articulate 
a somewhat different mission for their theory.  See, e.g., Sachs, Legal Change, supra 
note 70. 
307 Thus, for example, Justice Scalia wrote an essay emphasizing the importance 
of the certainty and impartiality of rules of law rather than discretionary and ad hoc 
justice.  See Scalia, Rules, supra note 248. Justice Scalia’s focus upon, and preference 
for, legal rules, is a complementary element of his formalistic originalist jurisprudence.  
Both aspire to and purport to characterize constitutional argument as a highly 
structured practice that doe not require the diverse sources of constitutional authority 
and more open-ended kinds of argument that originalism’s critics endorse.  Martha 
Nussbaum has emphasized the formalism in contemporary conservative constitutional 
jurisprudence.  See Martha C. Nussbaum, Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: 
“Perception” against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2007) (arguing that 
recent constitutional formalism in the Court has produced doctrinal developments that 
have undermined important substantive constitutional rights and resulted in injustice). 
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original understanding is reconciled or harmonized with precedent.  Thus, the 
model of syllogistic reasoning provides the second part of originalism’s 
comprehensive theory of constitutional interpretation.  Originalists who 
distinguish constitutional construction from interpretation must (and do) offer 
an account for when construction is permitted.308  When they offer this 
account, however, they compromise the originalist agenda of restricting 
judicial discretion and the role of judgment.   
B. The Critics’ Alternative to the Formal Account of Legal Reasoning 
 
There are three principal objections to the originalists’ theoretical account 
of legal reasoning: that syllogism fails to capture the complexity of 
constitutional arguments; that constitutional interpretation is primarily a 
matter of harmonizing conflicting or inconsistent interpretations; and that 
constitutional reasoning is not theoretical reasoning, but practical reasoning.  
Critics have largely emphasized only two of the objections. 
Critics of originalism adopt a different, less formal account of 
constitutional reasoning, but they often do so tacitly rather than expressly.  For 
example, critics argue that the methods of constitutional interpretation cannot 
be reduced to a syllogistic form in which only the express provisions of the 
constitutional text are taken as major premises.  They argue that legal 
reasoning is much more fluid, much more balancing, and more judgmental 
than the process described by originalism’s structured, syllogistic account.309  
The model of the syllogism fails to capture the richness and complexity of 
constitutional argument, either in theory or in practice.310   
Critics point to originalist argument as disproving such an account.  
Constitutional disputes about the scope of the habeas corpus writ with respect 
to detainees in Guantánamo, or the scope of the takings clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, appear to implicate precedential issues, ethical issues, prudential 
issues and even, perhaps, issues relating to institutional competences within 
the federal government.  These disputes would not appear to be easily reduced 
to questions about the validity of constitutional syllogisms.311 
                                                 
308 See generally WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 
118.  
309 See SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 240, at 13–34. 
310 See TRIBE, INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 9 (arguing that 
constitutional interpretation and decision proceeds in the context of, and in reliance 
upon “a vast and deep—and crucially, invisible—ocean of ideas, propositions, 
recovered memories, and imagined experiences”); see also PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra 
note 9, at 169–72; SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 240. 
311 In assessing this debate, we should acknowledge the limited descriptive claim 
made by originalism. Originalism acknowledges that current constitutional practice is 
full of error.  See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 95–100 (criticizing 
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The brief reconstruction of the argument in Heller above supports this 
claim.  The Heller argument is at once richer and less formal than a syllogistic 
account might suggest.  That departure cannot be explained on the basis that 
the opinion is designed to persuade the reader of its validity and therefore its 
rhetorical techniques reflect that advocacy.  The argument simply cannot be fit 
within the procrustean syllogistic model.  For example, many of the apparent 
premises of the argument are stated without argument or other derivation.312  
The second argument against the syllogistic reduction proffered in 
originalism is that much of the task of constitutional interpretation is one of 
harmonizing conflicting or inconsistent interpretations or arguments.313  The 
task is not so much one of finding an interpretation of the Constitution but of 
settling on only one.  The competing interpretations or potential decisions are 
not generally distinguishable on the basis of the validity of their embedded 
logical inferences, and the nature of their practical reasoning is often closer to 
an inductive model than to deduction.  Syllogisms are not very good at 
providing a solution to those kinds of problems of practical reasoning.314  By 
hypothesis, each of the competing interpretations or proposed decisions is 
supported by reason and argument.  The problem is not constructing a 
syllogism, but of weighing the arguments, evidence, and inferences implicated 
by the competing interpretations and decisions.  Those implications and 
inferences are not confined to the syllogisms that may be derived from an 
interpretation.   
The third argument begins by remarking that constitutional reasoning is a 
form of practical reasoning, not theoretical reasoning.315  Important accounts 
of practical reasoning recognize that such reasoning cannot be reduced to, or 
                                                 
Griswold); 111–16 (criticizing Roe v. Wade); 116–23 (criticizing the dissent in 
Bowers v. Hardwick); SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 41–42; 140 
(criticizing Planned Parenthood v. Casey on the basis that the right to an abortion is 
not protected by the Constitution, but acknowledging the authoritative force of 
precedent).  To the extent originalism offers prescription, departure from the 
description of existing practice is not necessarily troubling.  Still, there is a sense in 
which constitutional disputes do not appear to be easily assimilated to disputes about 
major or minor premises in a syllogism. 
312 The propositions stated in notes 287 and 288 are generally stated without 
argument. 
313  Bobbitt’s account is an example of a theory that emphasizes the indeterminacy 
of constitutional argument.  See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 88, at xi. 
314 See, e.g., POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 9, at 53–54 (describing the limitations 
of logic in substantive legal reasoning). 
315 See generally J. DAVID VELLEMAN, THE POSSIBILITY OF PRACTICAL REASON 
(1989); GILBERT HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW: PRINCIPLES OF REASONING 1 (1986) 
[hereinafter HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW]; TOULMIN, ARGUMENT, supra note 33. 
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assimilated to, deductive argument.316  Practical reasoning looks more like the 
kind of reasoning that Stephen Toulmin has described.317  Toulmin argues that 
our reasoning is richer and more complex than classical logical descriptions 
suggest.318  He acknowledges that the classical paradigm of logical reasoning 
is the syllogism.319  But he doesn’t think that the syllogism adequately captures 
much of our practical reasoning.320  In Toulmin’s reconstruction of our 
reasoning, instead of a major premise, minor premise, and conclusion, we have 
claims, data, warrants, backing, exceptions, and qualifiers.321  The relationship 
of these elements of argument is more complex and intricate than mere 
syllogisms easily capture.  Indeed, Toulmin highlights the ambiguity of 
common syllogisms.322  According to Toulmin, syllogisms of first order logic, 
stripped of a modal vocabulary, cannot do the work that we need them to do.323   
The formal model for legal reasoning adopted by originalism is a corollary 
to the claims of reliance on the unique, knowable original understanding of the 
Constitution.324  By claiming that the legal reasoning necessary for 
constitutional decision-making is syllogistic, wide swathes of informal, 
practical styles of reasoning are excluded from the account.325  Such a formal 
model reinforces the claims of originalism that constitutional disputes are 
semantic disputes.  If legal reasoning (along with many other forms of practical 
reasoning) is the more complex, open-ended practice that Toulmin describes, 
the originalist project of rendering a formal account of the Constitution and 
constitutional reasoning appears less plausible, if not wholly inadequate.326   
                                                 
316 See, e.g., HARMAN, CHANGE IN VIEW, supra note 315, at 1 (describing how, as 
a matter of practical reasoning, we come to change our views, giving the seemingly 
simple example of changing one’s mind about what to have for breakfast).   
317 TOULMIN, ARGUMENT, supra note 33, at vii (making a philosophical claim that 
argument in practical reasoning is irreducible to “a rigidly demonstrative deduction of 
the kind to be found in Euclidean geometry.”). 
318 Id. at 89 (explaining the nature of legal arguments). 
319 Id. (discussing the Aristotelian account of reasoning). 
320 Id. at 89–100; see also PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 9, at 169–72 (applying 
Toulmin’s description to legal argument). 
321 TOULMIN, ARGUMENT, supra note 33, at 89–100. 
322 Id. at 100–05.  Toulmin offers the example of the proposition “All A’s are B’s.”  
That proposition may be true for a variety of reasons—by definition, by statute, by 
empirical investigation, or as a moral value statement.  The short form statement 
obscures the significance and meaning of the claim. 
323 Id. at 89.  Toulmin takes the complexity of legal argument and proof as his 
model by which to amplify the customary syllogistic rendition of practical argument. 
324 See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 45. 
325 The analogical reasoning emphasized by Sunstein would appear to be excluded, 
for example.  See SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 240, at 62–83. 
326 The implications of Toulmin’s account of reasoning are reinforced by Bobbitt’s 
claim that there is no metric or method that can be applied to resolve the relative claims 
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In relevant part, the text of the First Amendment simply prohibits 
Congress from making any law abridging the freedom of the press.327  The 
originalists have split in their analysis of this provision.  Some have followed 
traditional constitutional doctrine328 in interpreting and applying the First 
Amendment to preclude similar legislation with respect to broadcast media.329  
How do they explain the disregard for the semantic meaning of the text and its 
original understanding and the expectations with respect thereto? Justice 
Scalia says that the language is a synecdoche.330  But he never explains why 
that language is a synecdoche, or even why the concept of reading a term in a 
constitutional provision as a synecdoche is permissible.  Such a reading reveals 
the tacit invocation of informal techniques that employ the principles of 
implicature in constitutional decision and interpretation.  But that is subtler 
and more complex than the formal account articulated suggests is possible.  
Others hew more closely to the language of the Amendment, interpreting the 
concept of speech more narrowly.331  They confine the protection of the 
amendment to political speech.332  Even Robert Bork extends the protection of 
the First Amendment to novel forms of communication,333 employing 
interpretative techniques that expressly go beyond history and text.334   
Justice Scalia’s account of the First Amendment’s reference to “speech” 
as a synecdoche never explains how that conclusion is to be supported by 
formal argument.335  Speech, after all, often meant speech, even in the 
eighteenth century.336  Indeed, reading speech as a synecdoche is to adopt a 
non-canonical interpretation of that term. The arguments that may be offered 
                                                 
of the six modes of constitutional argument.  Each can produce its own sets of 
syllogism, but no further formal argument can enable us to systematically determine 
which mode of argument ought to be controlling in a particular case.  See generally 
BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 88, at xi. 
327 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
328 See generally THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
656–67 (1969) (assuming that the First Amendment principles apply to broadcast 
media despite not being expressly mentioned and exploring the differences in the way 
in which the protections of the First Amendment ought to apply); ALEXANDER 
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). 
329  SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 37–38. 
330 Id. at 38 (“[S]peech and press, the two most common forms of communication, 
stand as a sort of synecdoche for the whole.”).  It is unclear what Justice Scalia means 
by his equivocation that it is a “sort of” synecdoche. 
331 Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 3, at 21 (“Any such reading [of speech to 
mean any form of expression] is, of course, impossible.”). 
332 Id. at 21–23. 
333 Id. 
334 Id. at 22. 
335 SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 38. 
336 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Samuel Johnson ed., 3d ed. 1762). 
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for such a reading are not easily cast as syllogisms with major and minor 
premises.   
C. Conclusion 
 
Originalism’s emphases on semantic content and the formal description of 
legal reasoning are complementary.  The syllogistic account works with 
arguments from and about meanings.  If originalism incorporated prudential 
arguments, such practical reasoning would not naturally be cast into syllogistic 
form.  Instead, informal inductive arguments, modal arguments, and other 
more complex inferential strategies, would likely be needed.337  So the 
exclusive focus on meanings makes the formal account of legal argument and 
reasoning more plausible.  Similarly, the formal account for legal reasoning 
helps to explain how judges may move from abstract statements about the text 
to decisions in particular cases.  Moreover, by reducing legal arguments to 
such formal logical models, originalism reinforces the claim to be neutral and 
non-discretionary.338   
The formality of Judge Bork and Justice Scalia’s account of legal 
reasoning is the second element of their theory of law.339  On their account, 
law generally, and constitutional law in particular, is best understood as a 
series of rules that can serve as the major premise in syllogisms of legal 
reasoning.340  The functional importance of those rules, like originalism itself, 
                                                 
337 For example, in a prudential argument in favor of restricting some of the historic 
constitutional rights of criminal suspects in the modern world of global, stateless 
terrorists with access to weapons of mass destruction, a significant part of the argument 
must address the premise of threat.  Such an advocate needs a Brandeis brief on 
terrorism.  This line of argument is empirical, not formal.  See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, 
NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006) 
(defending the constitutional permissibility of certain novel forms of surveillance 
while asserting the continuing need for constitutional limits on more intrusive forms 
of governmental intervention in our personal and social lives). 
338 The claim to neutrality and the project of cabining discretion has been central 
to originalism from the get go.  See Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 70; BORK, 
TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 140–41 (defending originalism as providing a metric by 
which to assess constitutional decisions and thereby to restrain judicial discretion).  
339 See generally, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 253–54, 262 
(characterizing proper constitutional argument as a matter of constructing syllogisms 
with the mayor premises drawn from the original meaning of the constitutional text); 
Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 3; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 45 
(characterizing the task of constitutional adjudication as simply that of applying the 
original meaning of the constitutional text to the case at bar). 
340 Scalia, Rules, supra note 248. 
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is to cabin the subjective preferences of judges.341  When an appellate judge 
adopts a legal rule, she not only binds lower courts, she binds herself.342 Thus, 
for Justice Scalia, legal rules coupled with stare decisis binds the judicial 
Odysseus to the mast, preventing escape to the siren calls confronting her.  Is 
this a plausible account, empirically, doctrinally, psychologically, or 
philosophically?   
I doubt it very much.343  First, legal history includes few accounts of 
judicial odysseys in which foresighted judges have been pinned by prior legal 
rules to the mast of consistent principle.344  Justice Scalia does not cite any 
examples in his Chicago essay.345  His account of the force of precedent seems 
implausible because judges generally recognize the primacy of judgment in 
their obligation to decide cases.346  It is unclear how the obligation to provide 
the best judgment would permit a prior judgment, now viewed as incorrect, to 
trump.347   
Second, as a matter of the nature of rules and rule-following, the kind of 
constraint Justice Scalia is invoking doesn’t exist.348  Justice Scalia has 
confused the space of reasons with the space of causes.349  Legal rules, 
howsoever abstract and broad of application, will not bind the appellate judge 
                                                 
341 Id. at 1176 (describing the criticism of vague laws as undemocratic because 
they shift decision making from the democratically-elected representatives of the 
people to judges or executive branch administrators); see also BORK, TEMPTING, supra 
note 7, at 141 (“[A]ny theory [of constitutional decision] worthy of consideration must 
both state an acceptable range of judicial results and, in doing that, confine the judge’s 
power over us.”). 
342 Scalia, Rules, supra note 248, at 1176–77. 
343 See FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM (2013); Baude, 
Originalism as a Constraint, supra note 1. 
344 Posner makes a very similar point in his discussion of the force of legal 
precedent in the courts.  See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 9, at 87–100; see also 
CROSS, supra note 343; Baude, Originalism as a Constraint, supra note 1.   
345 See generally Scalia, Rules, supra note 248. 
346 See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 88, at 166–67 (describing an 
exchange between Judge Learned Hand and Judge Henry Friendly). 
347 For an account of changing judgments in practical reasoning, see HARMAN, 
CHANGE IN VIEW, supra note 315.  For a more general approach to practical reasoning, 
see J. DAVID VELLEMAN, THE POSSIBILITY OF PRACTICAL REASON (1989). 
348 See WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, § 172.  It 
may feel that way, as Achilles suggested to the hare, but that is another matter.  See 
Lewis Carroll, What the Tortoise Said to Achilles, 4 MIND 278, 279 (1895). 
349 Cf. BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 251 (arguing that a non-originalist theory 
of the Constitution is impossible much like a perpetual motion machine is impossible 
under the laws of physics). 
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who formulated the rule in the manner Justice Scalia wants and asserts.  With 
respect to the lower court judges, the effect may be somewhat different.350  
Third, as a doctrinal matter, it does not appear that in the evolution of 
constitutional doctrine that rules have grasped the Court by the throat in a 
subsequent case and made it decide the case differently than it otherwise would 
have done.351  Proving that negative persuasively is not an easy task, of course.  
But in the absence of examples adduced by the proponents of the position that 
constitutional doctrine has such force, skepticism would appear justified.  The 
practice of the Court to revisit precedent as necessary casts substantial doubt 
upon the claim of constraint.  The modal, pluralist description of constitutional 
argument defended here offers an alternative account of decision that explains 
why decision is underdetermined rather than indeterminate but rejects the 
claim that the linguistic meaning of constitutional texts has constrained the 
Court’s decision of constitutional controversies. 
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF A BETTER ACCOUNT OF INTERPRETATION 
AND OF REASONING 
 
There are three principal implications of a richer account of interpretation 
and constitutional reasoning with respect to the debate over originalism. The 
first implication arises from the originalist commitment, shared with many of 
its critics, that the central task of constitutional decision is interpretation.352  
                                                 
350 Lower courts are bound by the decisions of their superior appellate courts.  Does 
this mean that their commitment to following precedent stands as a counterexample to 
Lewis Carroll’s fable?  Well, no.  The social practice of federal court adjudication and 
stare decisis insure that most lower courts will try very hard most of the time to follow 
their controlling precedent.  Moreover, their opinions will construct a narrative of 
harmony and compliance.  They will do so even when the governing precedents are 
muddy or confused.  Lower courts will do so for a variety of reasons.  At the margins, 
they are constrained, in theory, by the threat of impeachment, but that is a loose and 
unimportant constraint on doctrinal error.  More realistically, in the realm in which 
decisions are made, they do so because the professional and legal community of which 
they are respected members values such compliance and disfavors judges whose 
decisions must be reversed.  None of this account is novel or surprising, of course.  
But there is no sense in which such constraints on lower courts find themselves gripped 
by logic or precedent in a manner that compels an outcome in a manner inconsistent 
with the tortoise’s experience with Achilles.  See Carroll, supra note 348, at 279 (best 
read for the implicit lesson that not all inferences may be justified by express 
principles, as Brandom emphasizes). 
351 See generally id.; CROSS, supra note 343.  But see Baude, Originalism as a 
Constraint, supra note 1. 
352 See generally TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 6–30.  It is not clear 
that Tribe’s assertion of the primacy of interpretation is consistent with his later 
views.  See generally TRIBE, INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 5–8. 
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The premise that the task of decision is a matter of interpretation has led, for 
example, to the controversy over the problem of the level of generality.353  
Tribe and Dorf argue that constitutional provisions are of indeterminate 
generality, and that the interpretive problems posed by that indeterminacy 
preclude an exclusive originalism.354  Thus, according to them, the existence 
of the problem of generality precludes the reliance on original meanings that 
originalism demands.  The critics are wrong here.  
Tribe’s examples make a strong case that constitutional provisions do have 
different levels of generality. That demonstration sets up the need to determine 
the level of generality at which a provision is to be interpreted and applied. 
Tribe argues that the text alone cannot, as a linguistic matter, specify the level 
of generality without creating an infinite regress.355 
Having purportedly established the problem of generality, Tribe explains 
how a judge may determine the level of generality of a constitutional 
provision.356  The judge’s task incorporates both textual interpretation,357 and 
political and moral value choices.358  Tribe is at pains to note that not all 
constitutional provisions state or implicate broad moral principles.359  Within 
that broad framework for interpretation and adjudication, Tribe believes it is 
impossible to define a more precise description of, or decision theory for, 
judging.360  Instead, Tribe’s approach, as reflected in his work, American 
Constitutional Law, is much more concrete and historical.361  His first strategy 
is to describe a variety of constitutional provisions and to invite the reader to 
acknowledge that the provisions do not have a transparent statement of their 
level of generality.362   
                                                 
353 See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 73. 
354 Id. at 73–74, 80. 
355 Id.  
356 Id. at 73. 
357 Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 77. 
358 TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 78–80 (citing Paul Brest and 
concluding that even after semantic and linguistic analysis is done, that “[t]he value-
laden choice of a level of generality remains.”). 
359 Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 68, 72, 80. 
360 Id. at 68–69 (emphasizing the complex and not wholly consistent sources and 
strands of the constitutional text and rejecting interpretations that offer a single, 
unifying interpretation of that text). 
361 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 
1988). 
362 See generally id. (describing seven theoretical models of the Constitution that 
tacitly informed the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence over time, not as competing 
modes of constitutional argument as in Bobbitt’s modal account); TRIBE & DORF, 
READING, supra note 9, at 73–80. 
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Originalists deny the existence of a problem of generality.363  They argue 
that the text and the context of the Constitution usually make clear the level of 
generality at which a constitutional provision speaks.364   In the face of 
uncertainty, the alternatives are to disregard the unclear provision or to 
construe it at the most specific, least general level.365  It is not easy to restate 
the debate on this issue in a manner that permits a more productive dialogue.  
It may be helpful, however, to consider the respective positions in the context 
of specific examples.   
The First Amendment provides in relevant part that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press . . . .”366  At what 
level of generality does that prohibition operate?  That question was implicitly 
before the Court in Citizens United.367  The issue of generality presented itself 
in at least three dimensions in Citizens United: the scope of the definition of 
speech, the limits of a protected right, and the scope of speakers protected.368  
Justice Scalia concurred in the opinion of the court holding that the First 
Amendment protects the right of corporations to fund political film 
distribution costs.369  In so holding, Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens debated 
these questions by reference to the original understanding of the First 
Amendment.370  Justice Scalia argued that the original understanding was that 
all persons are protected.371  Therefore, he read the level of generality as 
absolute, even in the face of the dissent’s objection that corporations cannot 
speak,372 an argument Justice Scalia dismissed as “sophistry” without defense 
                                                 
363 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, note 2, at 135 (arguing that the context of 
a provision determines its meaning and, accordingly, its scope or generality); BORK, 
TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 149–50. 
364 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, note 2, at 135; BORK, TEMPTING, supra 
note 7, at 149–50. 
365 BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 166; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 
127–28, n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (“One would think that Justice Brennan would 
appreciate the value of consulting the most specific tradition available . . . .”).  Justice 
Scalia never explains or defends his claim that in constitutional decision a judge should 
look for the most particular constitutional interpretation or construction, or his ad 
hominem claim that Justice Brennan should endorse such an approach.  On its face, 
such an approach may appear narrow and mechanical, absent any indication that the 
Constitution ought to be read that way.  Moreover, the critics are right that a text cannot 
be self-interpreting. 
366 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
367 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
368 Id. 
369 See id. at 385–93 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
370 See id. at 391–92 (Scalia, J., concurring), 425–29 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
371 Id. at 385, 385–86 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
372 Id. at 428 n.55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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or amplification.373  Justice Scalia apparently thought the argument sophistical 
because the law attributes personality to corporations in a variety of contexts 
in order to hold them legally responsible for the acts of their agents and to 
regulate their activity, through their agents, more generally.374  But an 
argument for personality in the contexts of liability and regulation hardly is 
dispositive for a corresponding concept in the case of First Amendment rights.  
Nor do fundamental considerations of fairness, arguing that burdens and 
obligations ought to be paired with rights, provide a plausible argument, 
because questions of fairness for juridical entities are very different (if 
meaningful at all) compared to the corresponding questions for natural 
persons.  We are perhaps betrayed by our language into thinking the 
correspondence is closer than it actually is.375   
The argument with respect to the generality of the prohibition on 
abridgement was subtler.  The Court moved quickly past the question of what 
qualifies as speech, vaguely referring to a “speech process” and relying on the 
established doctrine reading protected speech broadly. 376 Justice Scalia reads 
the term “speech” as a synecdoche for the implicit expansive communicative 
concept, which he found to include financing film distribution costs.377  It is 
difficult to reconcile the holding in this case, or the dissent, with the 
proposition that the generality of this constitutional provision can be extracted 
from the semantic meaning of its terms.  If the generality of the provision and 
its associated linguistic and constitutional legal content is not simply a matter 
of the semantic meaning of its terms, what are the sources of such content?  
                                                 
373 Id. at 392 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Justice Scalia’s claim that the argument 
that corporations cannot speak is sophistry likely is based upon two tacit premises.  
First, corporations can do nothing on their own; they must always act through agents, 
generally human, but potentially other agents, too (one imagines a corporation offering 
drug interdiction services that employs specially trained beagles).  Second, we 
nevertheless generally employ the legal fiction of regulating corporations, both civilly 
and criminally.  Selectively ignoring our array of fictions speaking to corporations 
only in the context of constitutional rights without explanation or argument does 
indeed appear specious.  That conclusion does not resolve the question whether the 
First Amendment’s protections extend to corporations. 
374 Id. at 392–93 (emphasizing that there is no disagreement that the production of 
the film was a form of speech). 
375 See WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, § 350 
(asking what it would mean for it to be 5 o’clock somewhere on the surface of the 
sun). 
376 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 336–37. 
377 Id. at 392–93 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasizing that speech has always been 
read broadly, not literally in interpreting the protection of the First Amendment); see 
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, note 2, at 37–38 (arguing that “speech” and “press” 
are used like synecdoche in the First Amendment). 
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How do the originalists and their critics reconcile such sources with their 
accounts of constitutional reasoning?   
One solution to this puzzle is to recognize that this dispute over the 
purported problem of generality is, at best, confused.  If we discard the premise 
that the application of a rule first requires an interpretation of the rule, then it 
seems unlikely that there is a problem of generality.  The rule grasped and 
applied simply has a level of generality. That is what the rule is, and how it is 
applied.378  We do not need to have a question of interpretation independent of 
the question of how the rule is to be applied.379  One might try to rehabilitate 
Tribe’s claims about the problem of generality as a badly stated claim about 
the uncertainty as to how a rule is to be applied.380  That is, Tribe’s claim that 
the text of a rule cannot tell us how to interpret the rule or, more importantly, 
to apply the rule, is more plausible. 
 But Tribe’s claim misses the point that we can understand and follow an 
array of rules without ever needing something else with which to interpret such 
rules.  Tribe’s claim could be recast as an assertion that the choice of how to 
apply a rule requires a value choice or judgment.  The objection to such a claim 
is that it appears reductive.  It appears to derive the constitutional ought or rule 
from a moral or other sphere of value.381  The choices that inform 
constitutional decision are constitutional choices and are made within the 
context of our constitutional practice.  Those constitutional choices cannot be 
reduced to political or to moral choices, but that is not to assert that those 
choices are wholly independent of those political and moral choices and 
values.  Justice Scalia contrasts the extremes of textual literalism and 
nihilism,382 and other originalists also appear to assume that the alternative to 
                                                 
378 See generally WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, 
§§ 83–240, and text at supra notes 220–238.  Robert Brandom has also rejected of the 
problem of infinite regress.  Brandom, Legal Concept Determination, supra note 17, 
at 21–22 (expressly invoking Lewis Carroll’s logic fable of Achilles and the Tortoise 
to deny that a legal rule needs an interpretation before it can be applied).  See generally 
LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31, at 320–22. 
379 See generally WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, 
§§ 83–240, and text at supra notes 220–238. 
380 This rehabilitation appears difficult as a textual matter because one of Tribe’s 
central, repeated objections to originalism’s claim to neutrality is that value judgments 
must be made in constitutional decision.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICES (1985); see also TRIBE, INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 5–8 
(arguing that we cannot read and apply the Constitution without also understanding an 
Unwritten Constitution that incorporates the unspoken and unwritten foundations 
underlying and tacitly incorporated in the Constitution). 
381 I am unclear whether Tribe intends such a reduction, but I am inclined to believe 
so.  Exploring that question would take us too far afield here. 
382 See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra, note 2, at 24. 
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principled originalist decision is unfettered judicial discretion.383  Both 
dichotomies are forced and misleading.  Constitutional decision can be 
constrained and subject to limitations of practice without being determinate or 
reducible to an algorithm.   
If we reject the premise that constitutional decision must begin with an 
interpretation of the Constitution, the problem of generality does not arise.  The 
problem of generality is a problem of interpretations, not a problem of 
applying rules themselves.  The knowledge of the rule consists in the 
knowledge of how to apply it.  There is no problem of generality in the rule of 
addition.  There is no reason to accept the epistemological premise that one 
cannot know how to follow or apply a rule unless and until one has a 
controlling interpretation of the rule.384  Tribe’s criticism of originalism on this 
ground is unpersuasive.385  Here the originalists have the better stance, but not 
for the reasons they advance.  It is not that the text is self-interpreting, but that 
constitutional decision may proceed without a logically prior interpretation of 
the constitutional text.  But the benefits from rejecting the claim that 
interpretation is logically prior to application of constitutional rules goes 
beyond dissolving the paradox of the level of generality. 
The second implication of a better account of adjudication that does not 
make interpretation the prior and primary element in constitutional decision is 
more fundamental.  If interpretation is not prior to decision, then an account of 
constitutional adjudication must explain constitutional decision without 
necessarily beginning with interpretation.  This article has explained why 
describing judicial decision as beginning with interpretation is an unpersuasive 
account of constitutional rules and rule following. In addition to the generality 
puzzle described above, beginning with interpretation mistakenly 
overemphasizes the constitutional text and the semantic and linguistic 
dimensions of that text and our constitutional law.  The practice of 
constitutional law is not entirely a linguistic practice.  That is in substantial 
part because the performative dimension of legal texts—the Constitution and 
                                                 
383 See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 254–57 (arguing that the absence 
of a moral consensus precludes a legitimate appeal to moral principles in law). 
384 See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 31, at 280 n.79.  An analogy 
may be found in the rules of grammar; many are able to speak grammatically without 
being able to state or interpret the applicable grammatical rule that makes a particular 
utterance grammatical.  It is not a perfect analogy because the practice of constitutional 
law requires the authoritative participants not just to decide cases but also to make and 
respond to arguments.  But while some of those arguments are grounded on 
interpretations and interpretative claims, not all are—or need to be.  See MOLIÈRE, LE 
BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME Act II, scene iv (F. M. Warren ed., 1899) (1670). 
385 See TRIBE & DORF, READING, supra note 9, at 73–80; LeDuc, Ontological 
Foundations, supra note 31, at 320–22; Brandom, Legal Concept Determination, 
supra note 17, at 19–20. 
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judicial decisions—is embedded in the constitutional practice of deciding 
constitutional controversies.  Those practices are not plausibly reduced to 
entirely linguistic practices.  The best alternative to the interpretative model of 
the debate is the modal, pluralist account articulated by Bobbitt and Patterson 
and, more recently, by Brandom386 and me.387  That account dispenses with a 
reductive formalistic, linguistic description of practical reasoning in 
constitutional decisions.  This article has explained in more depth why the 
description of constitutional interpretation assumed or defended by both 
originalists and their critics and the role accorded interpretation in 
constitutional decision is inadequate.  Briefly, there is a better alternative 
description.  The limitations of the interpretative model and the existence of a 
richer, more accurate alternative thus offers another powerful argument for a 
non-interpretative theory of constitutional decision.  
The third important implication of a richer description of our practice 
arises with respect to our account of constitutional reasoning.  If interpretation 
is not a condition precedent to constitutional decision, then we are positioned 
to describe constitutional decision in non-interpretive terms.  Our account of 
constitutional argument and decision can incorporate the modes of 
constitutional argument that are manifestly non-interpretive like prudential, 
structural, and doctrinal, the last of which, to the extent it is interpretive, is not 
interpretive with respect to the constitutional text alone.  We can capture the 
social practice of constitutional argument and decision in the various forms 
that it takes.  For example, at least since the introduction of the Brandeis brief, 
prudential arguments are made in constitutional cases.388  The consequences 
of decisions can be debated and the description of those consequences that 
prevails—often, of course in the face of uncertainty—can be taken into 
account in the decision of the case. 
Originalism and its critics rely upon very different accounts of 
constitutional reasoning.  The formal originalist account of constitutional 
reasoning is manifestly unsatisfactory as a description of our practice of 
constitutional reasoning as captured by the Court’s opinions.  The non-
originalist account appears on the right track when it asserts that constitutional 
                                                 
386 Brandom, Legal Concept Determination, supra note 17, at 19–20 (offering a 
Hegelian description of judicial decision that emphasizes the reciprocal roles of 
authority and responsibility for judges). 
387 LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 6; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational 
Challenge, supra note 194. 
388 See generally MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 161 (2009) 
(discussing Justice Brandeis’ development of a revolutionary form of legal brief that 
relied on scientific data and social science research rather than on traditional 
constitutional arguments and legal citations alone). 
116       UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 16, No. 1 
 
reasoning is more informal and flexible than the originalist account.389  When 
we study the way that the Court (and dissenting Justices) articulate their 
arguments, we see that it is not cast in syllogistic form.390 The arguments made 
cannot be reduced to that form and important elements of the opinions often 
are not cast as arguments at all. 
Those models of constitutional reasoning are largely tacitly assumed 
rather than defended.391  Originalism generally assumes a highly formal, 
syllogistic model.392  The model is one of major and minor premises, linked 
by the principles of deductive inference.393  It is not clear that inductive 
reasoning is a significant part of this account.394  For example, inductive 
arguments with respect to the consequences of potential interpretations or 
decisions would generally not be proper.395  That prohibition on inductive 
argument, which requires an ordered set of particular consequences which 
could be enumerated as the basis for an argument as to the proper interpretation 
or application of a constitutional provision.  Those particulars in the present 
day, of course, likely could not have been understood, anticipated, or intended 
                                                 
389 See, e.g., Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 4, at 83–87; TRIBE & DORF, 
READING, supra note 9, at 114–17. 
390 While it might be argued that the argument incorporates implicit, suppressed 
premises, and with the introduction of these premises the argument could be recast as 
a series of syllogisms, it is not clear that such a redescription is compelling.  Some of 
the sentences in the opinions do not appear to figure into an argument at all, yet they 
do not appear to be extraneous asides.  See generally BRANDOM, INFERENTIALISM, 
supra note 137, at 82–92 (rejecting a description of practical reasoning as syllogistic 
through such an imputation of suppressed premises). 
391 See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 145 (characterizing the 
Constitution as articulating abstract principles in its provisions, the original 
understanding of which must first be understood and then applied to the case at hand); 
Easterbrook, Alternatives, supra note 47 ; POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 9, at 53–86 
(rejecting the model of the logical syllogism for legal reasoning and arguing that logic 
can play only a critical, constraining role in legal reasoning, helping to avoid error but 
not to reach correct substantive results); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 261–65 
(suggesting that constitutional reasoning may be cast in the formal logic of syllogism).   
392 See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 262 (describing constitutional decision 
as requiring interpretation to determine the applicable constitutional rule and 
syllogistic reasoning to apply that rule to the case at bar).  
393 Id. 
394 Inductive reasoning may be employed in originalism to define terms used in a 
constitutional provision, for example.  Examples of instances qualifying under a 
definition might thus help determine whether the relevant term encompassed the object 
or activity presented in the case at bar.  But even in that instance, once the definition 
had been derived, the constitutional argument would appear susceptible of being cast 
in a deductive mode. 
395 Such arguments would appear impermissible both as inductive arguments and 
because they focus upon the consequences of alternative interpretations or decisions. 
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(or unintended) by the relevant original actors.396  Even in the case of 
particulars that may have been known to the relevant original actors, however, 
originalism would account for those facts only in a mediated manner as 
evidence for the meaning or understanding of the meaning of the relevant 
provision.397  Thus, the formality of the syllogistic reasoning would be 
preserved.  Those originalists who do not go as far as Bork in asserting that 
constitutional reasoning is syllogistic nevertheless generally endorse formal 
accounts, too.398 
 Critics have challenged that account, both as a description of how courts 
reason, and as a prescriptive account of the task of adjudication.  With respect 
to the account of legal reasoning about the Constitution, Aristotelian 
syllogisms play far less of a role than originalists tacitly assert.  Legal 
reasoning cannot be easily so reduced to that logical form.  Sophisticated 
accounts of the complexity of reasoning, from Stephen Toulmin to modern 
modal logicians, offer a theoretical account of our reasoning that supports the 
empirical evidence we find for more complex patterns in constitutional 
opinions and arguments.399  When we turn to that theory both for its descriptive 
force and as a theoretical, normative account of how our constitutional 
reasoning should proceed, the formalist foundations of originalism do not 
survive.  Without those foundations, some of the manifest appeal of 
originalism’s crystalline clarity dissolves; when we return to Wittgenstein’s 
“rough ground”,400 we may find that we need a richer theory of constitutional 
adjudication and interpretation than originalism, or generally its critics, offer.   
                                                 
396 To the extent such particular consequences could have arisen in the relevant 
past, such instances could support an inductive argument for the original 
understandings or intentions. 
397 Thus, for example, when the Court considers arguments about the scope of the 
President’s authority under the Recess Appointments Clause, it does not consider 
arguments from pure political philosophy.  Instead, it refracts those arguments thru the 
lens of our practice of structural arguments about the particular democratic republican 
state that the Congress has created.  See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2568 
(2014) (arguing in favor of the conclusion that the Clause ought to apply to pre-
existing vacancies so that the work of the government might proceed).  See generally 
LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 6, at 214–18. 
398 See, e.g., Scalia, Rules, supra note 248. 
399 See, e.g., BRANDOM, INFERENTIALISM, supra note 137, at 82–92 (describing 
practical reasoning); DAVID K. LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS (1973) (describing the 
nature of counterfactual conditionals); TOULMIN, ARGUMENT, supra note 33. 
400 See WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 79, § 107 
(suggesting that our philosophical analysis of language ought not to elide the apparent 
anomalies and complexities of ordinary language and use). 
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Such an account of constitutional reasoning exists.  But it must begin, as 
Hart did, with a description of our legal practices.401  Theory must begin with 
description.  There is no authoritative, normative stance that stands both within 
our practice of constitutional argument and decision, as well as outside and 
above that practice.  That claim is neither obvious nor generally accepted, of 
course.  I have previously offered my own rendition of the arguments for the 
claim and I will not reiterate them here.402   
The failure to articulate the foundations that originalism assumes in 
characterizing constitutional argument has also resulted in the protagonists in 
the debate often talking past each other.  Originalism is committed to a formal 
account of constitutional argument, while its critics would include other forms 
of argument, too.  Without common ground on the methodological question as 
to the nature of permissible constitutional argument, it is hardly surprising that 
there is no agreement on the conclusions that may be drawn from such 
arguments.  Robert Bork was perhaps the originalist who has been clearest on 
this point, denying legitimacy to the more free-form opinions and decisions of 
the Warren Court on the grounds that their reasoning was improper.403  But 
because many of originalism’s critics do not share originalism’s model of 
interpretation and practical reason, there is little room for agreement.  It is not 
clear that agreement on the methodological question would lead to an 
agreement on the substantive disagreements, but the resulting debate would be 
more transparent.  Each side would need to begin by recognizing that they 
must defend their respective accounts of constitutional reasoning and 
argument on descriptive and prescriptive grounds.  We need an adequate 
descriptive account because the practice of constitutional argument and 
decision is groundless; there is no Archimedean stance from which to radically 
reform that practice.  Therefore, any adequate account of the practice must 
begin with an adequate description.   
The potential to rehabilitate the debate over originalism is not promising. 
The debate is derivative of more fundamental disagreements about the nature 
of law and practical reasoning.  Resolution of the debate over originalism, on 
the terms on which it has been conducted, would appear hostage to those more 
fundamental controversies.  The originalists adopt a simplistic model of 
practical reasoning that they assert or assume is applicable in the reasoning of 
                                                 
401 HART, CONCEPT, supra note 138, at 88–91 (insisting on the existence of an 
internal point of view toward legal obligations as an element of a description of our 
social behavior). 
402 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 194; LeDuc, 
Striding Out of Babel, supra note 6; see also BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 14, at 3–8 
(describing a groundbreaking pluralist modal account of constitutional argument and 
decision); PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 9, at 151–79 (describing and defending 
what he terms “post modern jurisprudence”). 
403 See, e.g., BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 7, at 95–100 (criticizing Griswold). 
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constitutional judicial decision.  Their critics reject that model. The 
originalists’ model buttresses their claims that originalism’s methods are the 
only legitimate methods, but originalism’s modes or arguments could be 
salvaged and deployed in the context of particular controversies without the 
claims it makes about constitutional reasoning.404  Those claims about 
constitutional reasoning are employed in defense of originalism’s claim to 
privilege the methods of interpretation based upon the original understandings, 
expectations, and intentions.  But those modes of argument—albeit not as 
privileged modes—are legitimate simply because they are an accepted part of 
our practice of constitutional argument.405  They do not need any further 
foundation.  Accordingly, the rejection by originalism’s critics of the 
originalist account of constitutional reasoning also does not discredit the 
modes of originalist argument, or privilege the kinds of argument that 
originalism’s critics make—and generally seek to privilege in turn.   
Resolving the debate over practical reasoning does not, however, open a 
path for the critics to prevail in their arguments against originalism.  A richer 
account of constitutional reasoning does not discredit the originalists’ textual 
and historical arguments or privilege the competing modes of argument that 
their critics emphasize.  But without a resolution of the dispute over the nature 
of practical reasoning in constitutional decision, the potential to move beyond 
the debate appears remote.  Originalism employs its account to buttress its 
central claim that the textual and historical methods of originalism are 
privileged, generally controlling in the interpretation of the Constitution that 
originalists endorse.  Without that privilege, originalism is no longer 
originalism in any of the canonical forms that we have known it, even if the 
originalist methods of argument survive intact.  On my account, the claims 
with respect to practical reasoning and the interpretative method are central to 
the claim to privilege historical and textual modes of argument.  Rebutting 
those arguments may simply send the originalists in search of alternative 
grounds for such a privilege.  If their critics acknowledge that their richer, 
alternative account of constitutional reasoning does not discredit textual or 
historical arguments—or privilege competing modes of argument—then they 
are likely to go in search of such alternative arguments.  In that event, only the 
field on which the debate over originalism unfolds would change.406  But both 
responses would be mistakes. 
                                                 
404 See LeDuc, Striding Out of Babel, supra note 6. 
405 See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 194; LeDuc, 
Striding Out of Babel, supra note 6. 
406 It may appear that the project of this article and the substantive conclusions 
expressed here are inconsistent with my deflationary account of the debate.  See 
LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 32,  The arguments 
here are simply therapeutic strategies to elucidate the confusions inherent in the 
originalism debate. 
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Why then do the accounts of interpretation and practical reasoning matter, 
if the two stances in the debate and debate itself are confused and its pursuit 
fruitless?  The accounts of interpretation and practical reasoning matter 
because if the theoretical commitments to particular accounts underlying the 
originalism debate are discarded, then we can recognize the legitimacy of a 
more complex practice of constitutional argument and decision.  If that more 
inclusive, pluralist practice is legitimate, then we may return to that practice 
without the aspirations of the protagonists in the debate to fundamentally 
reform our practice of constitutional argument and decision.  We may return 
to the project of considering the merits of competing decisions and alternative 
arguments for the hard constitutional questions that we face.407  Getting it right 
with respect to the role of interpretation and the nature of constitutional 
reasoning does not open a path to revivify the originalism debate but to 





                                                 
407 See generally LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 6, at 197–220 (sketching a 
post-debate reconstruction of three recent constitutional cases). 
